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Abstract. We develop a model-independent framework to study the dynamics of decision-
making in opinion networks for an arbitrary number of agents and an arbitrary number of options.
Model-independence means that the analysis is not performed on a specific set of equations, in con-
trast to classical approaches to decision making that fix a specific model and analyze it. Rather,
the general features of decision making in dynamical opinion networks can be derived starting from
empirically testable hypotheses about the deciding agents, the available options, and the interactions
among them. After translating these empirical hypotheses into algebraic ones, we use the tools of
equivariant bifurcation theory to uncover model-independent properties of dynamical opinion net-
works. The model-independent results are illustrated on a novel analytical model that is constructed
by plugging a generic sigmoidal nonlinearity, modeling boundedness of opinions and opinion percep-
tion, into the model-independent equivariant structure. Our analysis reveals richer and more flexible
opinion-formation behavior as compared to model-dependent approaches. For instance, analysis re-
veals the possibility of switching between consensus and various forms of dissensus by modulation
of the level of agent cooperativity and without requiring any particular ad-hoc interaction topology
(e.g., structural balance). From a theoretical viewpoint, we prove new results in equivariant bifur-
cation theory. We recall that the equivariant branching lemma states that generically each axial
subgroup leads to the existence of a branch of equilibria with symmetries given by that axial sub-
group.Here we construct an exhaustive list of axial subgroups for the action of Sn×S3 on Rn−1⊗R2,
which provides the dissensus decision behaviors for n agents deciding about three options or for three
agents deciding about n options. We also generalize this list to the action ofSn×Sk on Rn−1⊗Rk−1,
i.e., for n agents and k options, although without proving that in this case the list is exhaustive.
Key words. dynamical opinion networks, equivariant bifurcation theory, computational mod-
eling
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1. Introduction. Virtually any collective system of active agents must make
decisions and, as a preliminary step, form opinions about a set of possible options.
Modern humans collectively select a leader or form opinions about social and economic
issues with different types of electoral and information-sharing systems [74, 51]. Pres-
ent and past hunter-gatherer communities collectively decide where to collect and
hunt [65, 57]. Bees collectively decide on a new nest once the one they occupy is
exhausted or overpopulated [77, 76]. Animal groups collectively decide if and in
which direction to move, e.g., when approaching two possible food sources and the
movement direction determines where and what they will eat [16, 15, 14, 47, 78].
Neurons in lower brain areas integrate sensory inputs to perform perceptual and mo-
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tor behavior decision making, while neurons in higher brain areas integrate sensory-
motor information to make higher-level decisions and allocate attention and other
computational brain resources [11, 18, 28, 32, 49, 73, 61, 43, 7, 21, 38, 82]. Bacte-
ria and other social micro-organisms collectively decide, e.g., using quorum sensing,
how and when to undergo phenotypic differentiation in response to environmental
signals like nutrient scarcity or the presence of antibiotic [86, 85, 3, 56, 83, 40, 9].
A variety of different models have been developed to understand the origin of con-
sensus and dissensus opinion formation and decision making in a model-specific fash-
ion [12, 24, 53, 79, 84, 27, 63, 68, 1, 6, 20, 29, 42, 90, 46, 45, 54, 67, 31, 30, 13]. However,
a general theoretical framework, suitable to identify basic shared mechanisms as well
as system-specific differences, is largely missing.
Opinion changes in a multi-agent, multi-option decision-making process can be
viewed as a transition in state of a continuous state-space dynamical system driven by
parameters and time-dependent external inputs. The state represents the opinions of
the agents about the options. The parameters and external inputs represent possibly
time-varying features of the agents (e.g., resistance to forming or changing an opinion),
options (e.g., absolute value or quality), context (e.g., an approaching time deadline
or an approaching spatial boundary), or exchange (e.g., the attention the agents
pay to each other). Qualitative transitions in the agents’ opinion state determine
changes in the decision outcome. For instance, a group of three agents (e.g., three
people) can start a decision process over three options (e.g., three restaurants) with
no marked initial preferences. Discussing and accumulating evidence (e.g., checking
menus and prices on their phones), the three agents start to develop a preference for
the first alternative (e.g., the Argentinian grill). They are on the verge of making a
decision (e.g., reserving a table), when the second agent brings new evidence against
the chosen option (e.g., she remembers that a friend who is joining for dinner is
vegetarian). The first and third agents remain in favor of the first option, whereas
the second agent becomes conflicted between the remaining two options. Depending
on individual characteristics and factors associated with the setting, the agents may
continue discussing to reach a consensus on one of the options or they may reach
a dissensus by choosing different options (e.g., deciding to split into vegetarian and
non-vegetarian groups).
The prediction of state transitions as a function of parameter variations and in-
puts is the subject of bifurcation theory: a bifurcation diagram expresses the set
of solutions as a bifurcation parameter (or input) varies. Recent works have used
bifurcation theory to model decision making in a variety of biological and social sys-
tems [21, 39, 50, 52, 55, 64, 66, 70, 69, 91, 33, 18, 62, 26, 30]. Figure 1 summarizes the
general idea behind those works. The distinguished bifurcation parameter λ rules the
transition from an unopinionated to an opinionated state. The remaining auxiliary
(or, unfolding) parameters determine the qualitative properties of this transition. The
distinction between the two types of parameters, or inputs, calls for the use of the
bifurcation theory methods developed in [34, 36].
A bifurcation corresponds to a point in the state and parameter space where the
multiplicity, the stability, or both, of solutions change. In the idealized symmetric
case of two equally valuable options, the indecisive state can lose stability through
spontaneous symmetry breaking and bifurcate into two symmetric opinion-formation
branches, each favoring one of the options. As illustrated in the left diagram, the sym-
metry of the equations does not change, but the symmetry of the bifurcating solutions
do. Which branch is followed depends on initial conditions that might, for example, be
caused by random perturbations, a coin-flipping process. When options differ slightly
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Fig. 1. Decision making as a bifurcation phenomenon. Three bifurcation diagrams are shown
with a collective opinion variable on the vertical axis and bifurcation parameter λ on the horizon-
tal axis. Solid (dashed) lines are stable (unstable) opinion state. Arrows show flow of the stable
quasi steady-state as λ slowly increases. λ models a feature of the agents, options, context, or
exchange, which can change over time. The idealization that options are equally valuable leads
to symmetric bifurcation problems and pitchfork bifurcations. In a pitchfork bifurcation, sponta-
neous symmetry breaking leads to symmetric (equally valuable) solution branches. However, when
the idealizations are only approximately valid, generic forced symmetry breaking leads to asymmet-
ric solution branches by opening (or unfolding) the pitchfork in the direction of the more valuable
option.
in value, forced symmetry breaking changes the symmetry of the equations and can
change the structure of the bifurcation diagram, as illustrated by the right two dia-
grams. This symmetry-breaking perturbation leads to asymmetric opinion-formation
branches. The symmetry of solutions is broken in favor of the more valuable option.
Near a symmetry-breaking singularity the system has a heightened sensitivity,
which explains how a decision-making system can be highly responsive to changes in
parameters and external inputs, such as individual biases and option values. Away
from the singularity, the bifurcation diagram is robust, which explains how a decision-
making system can reject disturbances. In this way, bifurcation theory reveals how
decision-making systems can tune the balance between flexibility and robustness [5,
39].
We take a step toward the development of a general theoretical framework for
decision making in dynamical opinion networks by leveraging the model-independent
tools of equivariant bifurcation and singularity theory [36, 35]. We develop our ap-
proach for a group of equal agents deciding over a set of a priori equally valuable
options, a case that is not only mathematically tractable but also important for mod-
eling in its own right and as a means to examine messier real-world settings. The most
challenging decision-making problems correspond indeed to those in which the options
have near-equal value, the agents have no marked biases, hierarchies, or clusters, but
where making no decision is costly. These problems are also compelling because of
the flexibility they afford: an agent without bias can more quickly be won over to
another decision as compared to an agent who starts with a bias.
The case of equal agents and equally valuable options is mathematically tractable
because of the symmetries it possesses, namely, agent permutations and option per-
mutations, which admit the use of equivariant bifurcation theory for analysis. From
a singularity theory perspective, the highly symmetric case constitutes an organizing
center that determines or organizes the model behavior, even when the symmetry as-
sumptions are violated, i.e., when agents are not equal and options are not equally
valuable. Equivariant bifurcation theory applied at a decision-making organizing cen-
ter leads to a list of generic, i.e., likely, opinion-formation patterns emerging through
spontaneous symmetry-breaking and identifies the key parameters modulating the
deciding group behavior. Further, it is a general principle underlying the use of or-
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ganizing centers in mathematical modeling that the model-independent results are
robust to generic perturbations, which makes them especially practical.
The main model-independent results we prove are the following:
• Consensus or dissensus. Generically, opinion formation from the unopin-
ionated state will only lead either to a consensus state, where all the agents
share the same opinion, or to a dissensus state, where the agents disagree
in such a way that on average the group remains (close to) unopinionated.
The appearance of either consensus or dissensus is simply determined by the
balance between agent cooperation (how much an agent follows other agents’
opinions) and agent competition (how much an agent rejects other agents’
opinions), even in a fully homogeneous, all-to-all coupling topology. This is
in sharp contrast to existing model-dependent results that state the necessity
of specific network structures (e.g., structural balance) [1, 67, 13] or specific
initial conditions [27, 63, 68, 29, 20, 42, 90, 54], for stable dissensus to be
possible1.
• Uniform and moderate/extremist dissensus. Dissensus opinion forma-
tion happens in only two generic ways: 1) uniform dissensus or 2) moder-
ate/extremist dissensus. In uniform dissensus, the agent group splits into
equally sized clusters, each favoring a different option with the same inten-
sity. In moderate/extremist dissensus, the agent group splits into two clusters
of different sizes. Agents in the larger cluster, the moderates, have weak opin-
ions, while agents in the smaller cluster, the extremists, have strong opinions
in opposition to the moderates.
• Switch-like or continuous opinion formation. The way in which a de-
ciding group develops opinions can either be continuous, i.e., the magnitude
of the agents’ opinion state varies slowly and continuously as a function of
time and other ruling parameters, or switch-like, i.e., the magnitude of agents’
opinion state varies abruptly and almost discontinuously when certain thresh-
olds in time and/or in the parameter space are reached. A prediction of our
theory is that the continuous or switch-like nature of opinion formation is
mainly determined by the number of agents and the number of option. Con-
sensus opinion formation is always switch-like when the number of options is
larger than or equal to three. In the case of two options, consensus opinion
formation can either be continuous or switch-like, depending on the nature of
the organizing singularity. Dissensus opinion formation is always switch-like
in the presence of three or more options and three or more agents. When ei-
ther the number of agents or the number of options is equal to two, dissensus
opinion formation can be continuous or switch-like, again depending on the
nature of the organizing singularity.
A fundamental contribution of the companion paper [5], which we borrow in the pres-
ent paper, is the construction of a new general opinion-formation analytical model.
This model generalizes a number of published models, in the sense that it recovers
them for specific parameter choices and/or when linearized. Here, we use the gen-
eral analytical model to numerically illustrate the model-independent results listed
above. We further explain when and how the model-independent results depend on
alternative assumptions that can be made about the model symmetries. Alterna-
1Notable exceptions are [17, 88], where the proposed models get closer to the richness of the
model-independent theory by predicting dissensus opinion formation for all-to-all homogeneous cou-
pling.
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tive symmetries allow modelling distinct and specific ways in which agents and their
opinions can interact, e.g., the presence of structures, like cycles and clusters, in the
opinion network and its topology.
From an equivariant bifurcation theory perspective, consensus and dissensus are
two different irreducible representations of the symmetry group of the opinion-formation
dynamics. The possible ways in which agents agree in a consensus state is determined
by the axial subgroups of the consensus irreducible representation. Generically, at a
consensus bifurcation from an unopinionated state, the agents select a cluster of p
favored options that they favor over the remaining No − p disfavored options, where
No is the total number of options. The smaller is p the larger is the preference
that the agents assign to the favored options. We briefly discuss the possibility of
secondary bifurcations through which the agents could sequentially converge from p
options to a single favored option, for example, as a sequence of binary choices as
has been studied for spatial decision making in the plane [69]. The possible ways
in which agents disagree in a dissensus state is determined by the axial subgroups of
the dissensus irreducible representation. Uniform and moderate/extremist dissensus
correspond in particular to two different types of axial subgroups. More specifically,
we prove that there are only three conjugacy classes of dissensus axial subgroups, two
of which correspond to uniform dissensus and one to moderate/extremist dissensus.
Paper organization. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we intro-
duce a general setting to study opinion networks as smooth dynamical systems and
present all the model-independent results in a non-rigorous way, with only a minimum
of mathematical jargon. Section 3 discusses the relevance of the presented theoreti-
cal framework for many important real-world applications. Section 4 introduces the
basic concepts and results from equivariant bifurcation theory, underlying all the
model-independent results, and present the first model-independent result, namely,
the generic occurrence of consensus or dissensus opinion formation under suitable
symmetry assumptions. In Section 5 we revisit known results in equivariant bifur-
cation theory in the opinion formation setting and describe a list of low-dimensional
opinion formation behaviors. Section 6 presents the main theoretical results of the
paper and their interpretation in terms of opinion dynamics. In particular, it proves
the genericity of uniform and moderate/extremist dissensus and the switchy vs contin-
uous nature of opinion formation depending on the number of agents and the number
of options. Some conclusions and future directions are discussed in Section 7.
2. A dynamical systems theory of dynamical opinion networks.
2.1. Setting up the state space. We consider a network of Na ≥ 1 agents
that form an opinion about No ≥ 2 options. The state of agent i is denoted by the
vector Xi = (xi1, . . . , xiNo) ∈ RNo≥0. The positive number xij represents the opinion
of agent i about option j. The larger xij is, the greater the preference that agent i
has for option j. The entries of the vector Xi satisfy the No− 1 dimensional simplex
conditions xij ≥ 0 and
(2.1) xi1 + · · ·+ xiNo = 1.
Constraint (2.1) is based on the assumption that each agent has the same voting
capacity to distribute among the various options and this capacity is normalized to
one. Hence, each agent’s state space is the (No − 1) dimensional simplex ∆, and the
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state space of the dynamical opinion network is
(2.2) V = ∆× · · · ×∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
Na-times
,
which has dimension Na(No − 1). A point in the state space V is denoted by the
vector X = (X1, . . . ,XNa). The neutral point O ∈ V is the unique state where each
agent assigns the same proportional vote to each option; that is, O = (O1, . . . ,ONa)
where
(2.3) Oi =
(
1
No
, . . . ,
1
No
)
∈ ∆.
At the neutral point, all options are equally preferred by all agents.
Mathematical analysis will be performed in the translated variables defined by
state variations around the neutral point
(2.4) Z = X −O.
Let
(2.5) Vn = {y ∈ Rn : y1 + · · ·+ yn = 0} ∼= Rn−1.
Then Zi ∈ VNo for all i = 1, . . . , Na. Observe, moreover, that TOi∆ = VNo , that is,
working with the shifted variable Z is equivalent to working in V = TOV, i.e., the
tangent space to V at O. The linearized state space V decomposes as
(2.6) V = VNo × · · · × VNo︸ ︷︷ ︸
Na times
∼= (RNo−1)Na ∼= RNo−1 ⊗ RNa .
Remark 2.1. Developing the analysis in the linearized variables is justified by the
fact that only an agent’s relative opinions about the various options matter because its
total voting capacity is fixed. For interpretation and visualization purposes, variables
will be mapped back to the simplex.
In our model, agent i is unopinionated when its opinion state lies in a ϑ-neighborhood
of the neutral point, i.e. ‖Xi − Oi‖ ≤ ϑ, where ϑ ≥ 0 is a given threshold. Agent
i is opinionated otherwise, i.e., when ‖Xi −Oi‖ > ϑ. The continuous nature of the
state space allows to quantify the strength of an opinion. In particular, agent i is
weakly opinionated if ‖Xi − Oi‖ ≈ϑ and strongly opinionated if ‖Xi − Oi‖  ϑ.
Agent i favors an option j if it is opinionated and xij ≥ xil − ϑ for all l 6= j. Agent i
disfavors an option j if it is opinionated and xij < xil − ϑ for some l 6= j. An agent
is conflicted among a set of options if it has near-equal and favorable opinions about
all of them relative to the options not in the set. Note that with these definitions the
state space of each agent is partitioned into qualitatively different, non-overlapping,
opinion states. Figure 2a illustrates the definitions for No = 2 and Na = 3.
Based on their opinions, multiple agents can either agree or disagree. We illustrate
this concept in Figure 2b1, for the case No = 2, and Figure 2b2, for the case No = 3.
Two agents agree when they share the same qualitative opinion state and disagree
when they exhibit different qualitative opinion states. Observe that agents can agree
on favoring one of the options or they can agree by remaining conflicted between a
set of options. The group reaches an agreement state when all agents are opinionated
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Fig. 2. a) State space and opinion states of one agent i for No = 2 (a1) and No = 3 (a2)).
In a1), the 1-simplex is the segment ∆ ⊂ R2 with vertices (1, 0), (0, 1). The mid-point of the
segment is the neutral point Oi. If the agent’s state lies in a neighborhood of Oi, the agent is
unopinionated (region between the dashed lines). In a2), the 2-simplex is the triangle ∆ ⊂ R3 with
vertices (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1). The center of the triangle is the neutral point Oi. If the agent’s
state lies in a neighborhood of Oi, the agent is unopinionated. The dashed lines in the triangle
indicate points at which two options are exactly equally favored. If the agent’s state belongs to a
tubular neighborhood of these lines, the agent is conflicted between the corresponding two options
(light gray or color-coded depending on the conflicting options). In the remaining three regions (gray
or color-coded depending on the option), the agent favors one of the three options. b Agreement and
disagreement states of two agents i and k for No = 2 (b1) and No = 3 (b2).
and agree. If the group is in agreement and, moreover, ‖Zi − Zj‖ ≤ ϑ for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . , Na}, then the group has reached a consensus state. If at least one pair of agents
disagree, then the group is in a disagreement state. If the group is in disagreement
and the average agent is unopinionated, i.e.,
∥∥∥ 1Na ∑Nai=1Zi∥∥∥ ≤ ϑ, then the group is in
a dissensus state. Finally, the group is unopinionated if all agents are unopinionated.
Remark 2.2. Although motivated by collective decision-making problems, we avoid
providing a formal definition of “decision”, “deadlock” and other related terms. Those
concepts are indeed context-dependent. For instance, in a “democratic” decision-
making context, one could define “decision” as the state where at least a majority
of agents agree and “deadlock” otherwise. In a task allocation problem, however,
any opinion state could correspond to a valid decision. For instance, if all agents
are unopinionated, then the group has decided not to develop any task, whereas if
certain agents favor certain options they have decided to address the corresponding
tasks while the rest of the group does nothing. We will thus restrict the use of the
two concepts of decision and deadlock only to specific examples.
2.2. Collective opinion dynamics and symmetry. Given the definitions in-
troduced in Section 2.1, we want to answer the following questions. How can a group
of equal agents become opinionated about a set of a priori equally valuable options?
Are there prototypical opinion-forming behaviors that are generically observed in such
a dynamical opinion network? How does consensus or dissensus arise? How do the
opinion dynamics depend on system parameters and inputs, such as the number of
agents and options, the interconnection topology, and the presence of external sig-
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nals, such as agents’ biases toward certain options? To answer these questions, we
use equivariant bifurcation theory [36, 35] and model the time evolution of each agent’s
opinion as a smooth dynamical system
(2.7) X˙ = G(X, λ),
where λ ∈ R is the bifurcation parameter.
Remark 2.3. In some applications it might be convenient to model the evolution
of opinions in time as a discrete process [42, 47, 29, 20], i.e., according to a smooth map
Xk+1 = Gd(Xk, λ). Our results generalize to this setting by applying the equivariant
bifurcation theory to the discrete-time steady-state equation Gd(X, λ) −X = 0 in-
stead of the continuous-time steady-state equation G(X, λ) = 0. One must however
be careful in applying equivariant bifurcation theory to discrete-time dynamics as
intrinsically discrete dynamical phenomena, like the appearance of discrete periodic
orbits, are not trivially captured by the theory. We will not address discrete-time
dynamics in the remainder of the paper.
The bifurcation parameter λ can model a variety of features and parameters de-
pending on the context, for instance, the strength of information exchange between
agents (e.g., the attention paid to each other), the evolution of time toward a decision
deadline (like an upcoming political election), the changing relative spatial position of
a group of moving agents and an object in the environment, other influences exerted
by environmental signals (e.g., the scarcity of food), or a combination of them. When
these factors are sufficiently strong, we expect the neutral point and close-by unopin-
ionated states to become unstable. Having no clear opinion becomes unsustainable
or too costly and at least some of the agents transition to an opinionated state. The
system bifurcates from an unopinionated state to a qualitatively new opinion state.
State-dependent (feedback) dynamics for λ are derived and analyzed in [5].
Equivariant bifurcation theory is a model-independent theory, in the sense that
precise predictions about a modeled dynamical behavior can be formulated solely
based on empirical assumptions, without declaring any specific model. The first as-
sumption we have already implicitly made is that collective opinion dynamics can be
modeled as a smooth dynamical system in which opinions are valued in the simplex.
The other assumptions we make concern the model symmetries. Mathematically, two
agents are equal if interchanging them does not change the behavior of the opinion
dynamics. In other words, two agents are equal if the opinion dynamics are symmet-
ric with respect to interchanging the two agents. Similarly, two options are a priori
equally valuable if the opinion dynamics are symmetric with respect to interchanging
the two options. The most symmetric case is when all agents are equal (for instance,
there are no hierarchies as in a “democratic” decision process) and all options are a
priori equally valuable. In this case, model (2.7) has symmetry group
(2.8) Γ = SNa × SNo ,
where the permutation group SNa interchanges the agents and SNo interchanges the
options. The action of Γ on the opinion dynamics is rigorously defined in Section 4.3.
The opinion dynamics (2.7) have symmetry Γ = SNa ×SNo in the sense that they
are Γ-equivariant:
(2.9) γG(X, λ) = G(γX, λ), ∀γ ∈ Γ, ∀λ ∈ R.
Γ-equivariance is equivalent to requiring that the symmetry group Γ sends solutions
of (2.7) into solutions of (2.7). The fully symmetric situation is interesting because it
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provides a mathematically tractable organizing center to uncover generic properties
of opinion-forming behaviors. As we shall verify with numerical simulations, the pre-
dictions derived at an organizing center remain valid when the symmetry assumption
is violated, for instance, by introducing random heterogeneities across the agents, the
options, and their interactions.
Remark 2.4. Qualitative differences between the agents and between the options,
for instance, due to existence of clusters with sharply distinct prior biases or the
presence of structured coopetitive (i.e., both positive and negative) interactions [1],
can also be modeled in the equivariant setting by requiring that the symmetry group
of the opinion dynamics is a subgroup of SNa×SNo . The same techniques and results
from equivariant bifurcation theory used here for the fully symmetric case also apply
to the case in which part of the symmetry is lost due to biases or structured intra-
and inter-agent interactions.
Observe that because at O all agents have the same state and all options are
equally favored, γO = O for all γ ∈ Γ, that is, the neutral point is fixed by the
symmetry group of the model. Observe also that no other point in the state space is
fixed by all the group’s elements. In other words, the neutral point is the most sym-
metric point in the state space, where all agents share exactly the same opinion and
no options are favored or disfavored over the others. We will show that a dynamical
opinion network can leave this highly symmetric, completely unopinionated, state by
means of spontaneous symmetry breaking [35].
2.3. A vector field realization. For numerical illustration and exploration
purposes, we will rely on the analytical model introduced in the companion paper [5].
For simplicity, this realization was set up on the tangent space V . The resulting vector
field and dynamical behaviors can always be mapped to the product of simplexes V
by an affine change of coordinates, provided suitable boundedness conditions on the
dynamics on V . The proposed opinion formation dynamics is2
z˙ij = Fij(Z)− 1
No
No∑
l=1
Fil(Z)(2.10a)
Fij(Z) = −zij + λ
S1( Na∑
k=1
Ajjikzkj
)
+
No∑
l 6=j
l=1
S2
(
Na∑
k=1
Ajlikzkl
)+ bij(2.10b)
where S1,2 : R → R satisfies S1,2(0) = 0 and S′1,2(0) = 1 and is otherwise a generic3
bounded sigmoidal nonlinear function. It follows by the results in [5, Section III.B]
that (2.10) are a well-defined, bounded dynamics on V . Boundedness also implies
that the resulting vector field on V can be mapped to the full state space V using a
simple affine change of coordinates [5, Corollary III.5.1].
The adjacency tensor A in (2.10) defines that structure of the opinion-influence
network. If Ajlik is not zero, then the opinion of agent i about option j is influenced
by the opinion of agent k about option l. The sign and magnitude of Ajlik defines the
2In the proposed model, either or both of the sums over the agents could be swapped with the
sigmoidal functions. This modification does not change neither the interpretation of the model nor
the validity of model-independent predictions. However, this and other types of modifications could
change model-independent properties of the dynamics, like the stability of some bifurcation branches.
3In the sense that all the coefficients of its Taylor expansion at the origin are non-zero, or at
least up to a given degree.
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sign and strength of these opinion interactions. The numbers bij define the prior bias
of agent i for option j. Model (2.10) recover as special cases a number of nonlinear
and linear opinion formation models. See [5] for details.
Observe that the adjacency tensor A specifies distinct intra- and inter-agent
option-influence coupling topologies. 1) The intra-agent opinion coupling topology
of agent i is specified by the adjacency matrix Ajlii . It describes the influence network
between the opinions of agent i. 2) The inter-agent opinion-influence coupling topol-
ogy related to options j and l is specified by the adjacency matrix Ajlik. It describes
the inter-agent network of influence of the agents’ opinions about option l over the
agents’ opinions about option j.
Prior biases and the opinion interaction topology determine the symmetry of
model (2.10).
Theorem 2.5. Model (2.10) is Γ-equivariant if and only if bij = b ∈ R, Ajjii =
α ∈ R, Ajlii = β ∈ R, Ajjik = γ ∈ R, and Ajlik = δ ∈ R for all i, k = 1, . . . , Na, k 6= i,
and all j, l = 1, . . . , No, l 6= j.
Proof. Sufficiency simply follows by verifying (2.9), which leads to lengthy but
straightforward computations that we omit. Necessity will be proved in Section 2.5.
Remark 2.6. Under the assumption of Γ-equivariance, the drift term Fij(Z) in (2.10)
reduces to
Fij(Z) = −zij + λ
S1
αzij + γ Na∑
k=1
k 6=i
zkj
+ No∑
l=1
l 6=j
S2
βzil + δ Na∑
k=1
k 6=i
zkl

+ bij
(2.11)
Theorem 2.5 translates symmetry properties into readily verifiable and experimen-
tally controllable properties, like network topology and agents’ biases. In particular,
Γ equivariance is equivalent to asking that the coupling topology is all-to-all homo-
geneous in the sense that all the option-influence coupling topologies specified by the
adjacency tensor A are all-to-all and homogeneous. In practice, these assumptions do
not need to be verified exactly for the predictions of our theory to remain valid.
Remark 2.7. In general, the symmetry group of dynamics (2.10) is determined by
the automorphism group of the multi-graph associated to the tensor adjacency matrix
A. For instance, if the inter-agent topology is of dihedral type, e.g., an undirected
ring, then Γ = DNa × Γo, with Γo ⊂ SNo . See [5, Proposition IV.2].
Remark 2.8. In the lowest dimensional case of two agents deciding about two
options, model (2.10) is a universal unfolding of S2 × S2-equivariant singularities.
This observation originally motivated the functional form of model (2.10).
In the remainder of the paper, we use model (2.11), with S1(x) = tanh(x +
kh.t.o. tanh(x
2)) and S2(x) = 0.5 tanh(2x + 2kh.t.o. tanh(x
2)), kh.t.o. 6= 0, to numeri-
cally illustrate our theoretical predictions. The non-degeneracy condition kh.t.o. 6= 0
ensures that all the derivatives of S1 and S2 at the origin are non-zero. To high-
light the robustness of our predictions and their practical validity, all the simulations
are performed in perturbed symmetric conditions. That is, we do not use an ex-
act homogeneous all-to-all topologies and we allow the virtual agents to have small
heterogeneous biases.
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2.4. Consensus and dissensus arise from symmetry. Given the symmetry
assumptions, namely that the opinion-forming dynamics are Γ-equivariant, equivari-
ant bifurcation theory predicts that opinion forming follows two generic types of paths,
or bifurcation branches, as sketched in Figure 3. One type is tangent at O to the con-
sensus space
(2.12) Wc =
{(
v, . . . , v︸ ︷︷ ︸
Na-times
)
, v ∈ VNo
}
and the other to the dissensus space
(2.13) Wd = {(Z1, . . . ,ZNa) : Z1 + · · ·+ZNa = 0, Zi ∈ VNo}.
Observe that Wc ∼= RNo−1, Wd = VNo ⊗ VNa ∼= RNo−1 ⊗ RNa−1, and V = Wc ⊕Wd.
Points on the consensus space correspond the situations in which all the agents
have exactly the same opinion. Points on dissensus space correspond to the situation
in which the average ag ent is neutral. Observe that, according to our definition,
a consensus state is any state in a ϑ-neighborhood of the consensus space outside
a ϑ-neighborhood of the origin and, similarly, a dissensus state is any state in a ϑ-
neighborhood of the dissensus space outside a ϑ-neighborhood of the origin. The
set of consensus states reduces exactly to the consensus space for ϑ = 0 and the set
of dissensus states reduces exactly to the dissensus space for ϑ = 0. Mathematical
analysis will be developed inside the consensus and dissensus spaces, that is, for the
idealized fully symmetric case with ϑ = 0. The predictions of the theory will however
be practically valid (as numerically illustrated) under weakly violated symmetry and
for ϑ > 0.
Remark 2.9. Some consensus states correspond to conflicted opinions, e.g., as in
case c2 in Figure 3a, where the agents agree to exclude Option 3 but remain conflicted
between Options 1 and 2. In these cases, the group can still transition to consensus
on one of the options through secondary symmetry-breaking bifurcations at which the
conflicted equilibrium becomes unstable. The analysis of secondary equivariant bifur-
cations is likely to be intractable in general, as it requires high-dimensional singularity
theory. It has however been worked out in a handful cases [34, Chapter X],[36, Chap-
ter XV]. We discuss one of these examples for consensus opinion formation over three
options in Section 5.2.
Consensus and dissensus spaces appear as important objects in the opinion dy-
namics (2.7) because they are the two irreducible representations [36, Section XII.2],[35,
Page 14] of the symmetry group Γ. Certain “genericity results” (see [35, Theorem 1.27]
and [36, p.82]) ensure that, generically, bifurcations from the neutral, unopinionated,
equilibrium O happen either along the consensus space or along the dissensus space
through spontaneous symmetry breaking. We make these statements rigorous in
Theorem 4.6, Section 4. We can interpret these results from a modeling perspective
as follows. Consensus and dissensus are the only two likely and mutually-exclusive
opinion-forming outcomes of any initially unopinionated dynamical opinion network
that approximately satisfies our symmetry assumptions. These assumptions can be
weakly violated in practice while letting our predictions remain practically valid, a
statement that we will verify with numerical simulations in the next sections.
Remark 2.10. The splitting of opinion formation into consensus and dissensus
bifurcations generalizes to the case in which Γ = Γa×Γo, with Γa ⊂ SNa and Γo ⊂ SNo ,
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Fig. 3. The geometry of collective opinion formation. a)The consensus space Wc and dissensus
space Wd define complementary orthogonal subspaces at the neutral point O. Equilibria of the
opinion dynamics (2.7) vary according to the bifurcation parameter λ. The neutral point O is always
an equilibrium of (2.7), but at a bifurcation (see b), new equilibria generically appear along the
consensus space or along the dissensus space. Along the consensus space, the group is in a consensus
state: all agents have nearly the same opinion (c1,c2). In c1, the group reaches consensus on one of
the options, whereas in c2 it remains conflicted between the other two options. Along the dissensus
space, the group is in a dissensus state: agents remain unopinionated on average, in the sense that
the average opinion is close to neutral. The are two generic types of dissensus states: uniform
(d1) and moderate/extremist (d3). b) Bifurcation diagram representation of consensus (top) and
dissensus (bottom) opinion forming. At an opinion-forming bifurcation, the neutral state O loses
stability and new equilibria either appear along the consensus branch or along the dissensus branch.
Consensus branches are tangent to the consensus space Wc (see a), whereas dissensus branches are
tangent to the dissensus space Wd. Solid branches signify stable opinion states. Dashed branches
signify unstable opinion states. The bifurcation diagrams are sketched for illustration purposes.
such that both Γa acts transitively on {1, . . . , Na}. See Remark 4.7 for details. As an
example consider Γa = DNa , the dihedral group of order Na, and Γo = ZNo , the cyclic
group of order No. As observed in Remark 2.7, the modeling relevance of considering
different symmetry groups relies in the possibility of capturing different topologies of
the opinion network defined by (2.7).
Observe that the dimensions of the consensus and dissensus spaces are different
in general, as are the ways in which the symmetry group Γ acts on the two spaces.
The consensus space is generally lower dimensional and, because all agents have the
same state, the permutation group SNa acts trivially on this space. Opinion forming
along the consensus space is thus governed by SNo-equivariant bifurcations acting
on RNo−1, a type of symmetry breaking that has already been studied [23],[35, Sec-
tions 1.5, 2.6, 2.7]. The dissensus space is generally higher dimensional and the full
symmetry group acts nontrivially on this space. Opinion forming along this space
is governed by SNa × SNo -equivariant bifurcations acting on RNa−1 ⊗ RNo−1. These
types of bifurcations have been studied only for Na = 2 or No = 2 cases [2],[36,
Section XIII.5],[36, Chapter X]. We rigorously extend these results in Section 6.
2.5. The balance between agent cooperation and agent competition
selects between consensus and dissensus. A question that naturally arises is
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what determines the occurrence of consensus bifurcations, leading to group consensus,
versus dissensus bifurcations, leading to group dissensus?
Let G be a Γ-equivariant vector field on V, as in (2.7). Then the components of
G can be written as follows (see [81, 37] for details),
Gij = G˜
(
xij , {xi,l 6=j}, {xk 6=i,j}, {xk 6=i,l 6=j} , λ
)
− 〈G˜〉i(X, λ)(2.14a)
〈G˜〉i(X, λ) = 1
No
No∑
l¯=1
G˜
(
xil¯, {xi,l 6=l¯}, {xk 6=i,l¯}, {xk 6=i,l 6=l¯} , λ
)
(2.14b)
where the notation { · } signifies that G˜ is invariant with respect to permutations of
the elements appearing in the arguments. Given the invariance properties, subtracting
the average terms 〈G˜〉i(X) is necessary to impose that Gi1 + · · · + GiNo = 0. This,
in turn, ensures that each agent’s voting capacity remains constant as required by
the simplex condition (2.1). The invariance properties of G˜ imply that the smooth
functions
(2.15) α¯(λ) =
∂G˜ij
∂xij
∣∣∣∣∣
O
+ 1, β¯(λ) =
∂G˜ij
∂xil
∣∣∣∣∣
O
, γ¯(λ) =
∂G˜ij
∂xkj
∣∣∣∣∣
O
, δ¯(λ) =
∂G˜ij
∂xkl
∣∣∣∣∣
O
,
where k 6= i and l 6= j, are well-defined, in the sense that they do not depend on the
index choices.
Proof of Theorem 2.5 (continued). Specializing the invariance properties of a generic
Γ-equivariant vector field to the state-space realization (2.10), we can now prove the
necessity part of Theorem 2.5. Because possible affine terms in (2.14a) cannot depend
on the indexes, Γ equivariance imposes that biases are homogeneous across agents and
options. Moreover, well-definiteness of the functions in (2.15) implies that
λS′2(0)A
jj
ik =
∂Fij
∂zkj
∣∣∣∣
0
=
∂Fi¯j¯
∂zk¯j¯
∣∣∣∣
0
= λS′2(0)A
j¯j¯
i¯k¯
, ⇒ Ajjik = Aj¯j¯i¯k¯ = γ,
λS′1(0)A
jj
ii =
∂Fij
∂zij
∣∣∣∣
0
=
∂Fi¯j¯
∂zi¯j¯
∣∣∣∣
0
= λS′1(0)A
j¯j¯
i¯¯i
, ⇒ Ajlii = Aj¯j¯i¯¯i = α,
λS′1(0)A
jl
ii =
∂Fij
∂zil
∣∣∣∣
0
=
∂Fi¯j¯
∂zi¯l¯
∣∣∣∣
0
= λS′1(0)A
j¯l¯
i¯¯i
, ⇒ Ajlii = Aj¯l¯i¯¯i = β,
λS′2(0)A
jl
ik =
∂Fij
∂zkl
∣∣∣∣
0
=
∂Fi¯j¯
∂zk¯l¯
∣∣∣∣
0
= λS′2(0)A
j¯l¯
i¯k¯
, ⇒ Ajlik = Aj¯l¯i¯k¯ = δ,
for all i, k, i¯, k¯ ∈ {1, . . . , Na}, i 6= k, i¯ 6= k¯ and all j, j¯, l, l¯ ∈ {1, . . . , No}, l 6= j, l¯ 6= j¯.
Thus Γ equivariance implies that the agent coupling topology is homogenous and
all-to-all.
The following theorem shows that the sign and magnitude of the various numbers
introduced in (2.15) determine whether bifurcations are likely to appear along the
consensus subspace or along the dissensus subspace.
Theorem 2.11. Let (2.7) be Γ-equivariant and let α¯(λ), β¯(λ), γ¯(λ), δ¯(λ) be de-
fined as in (2.15). Suppose that there exists λ0 ∈ R such that
α¯(λ0)− β¯(λ0) + (Na − 1)(γ¯(λ0)− δ¯(λ0)) < 1(2.16a)
α¯(λ0)− β¯(λ0)− γ¯(λ0) + δ¯(λ0) < 1(2.16b)
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Suppose, moreover, that there exists ε > 0 such that (α¯(λ) − β¯(λ))′ ≥ ε, for all λ.
Then the following hold true.
1. The neutral equilibrium is stable for λ = λ0.
2. If γ¯(λ) > δ¯(λ) and (γ¯(λ) − δ¯(λ))′ ≥ 0, then the neutral equilibrium loses
stability for λ = λac > λ0 in a Γ-equivariant bifurcation along the consensus
space, where λac satisfies
α¯(λac )− β¯(λac ) + (Na − 1)(γ¯(λac )− δ¯(λac )) = 1.
3. If γ¯(λ) < δ¯(λ) and (γ¯(λ) − δ¯(λ))′ ≤ 0, then the neutral equilibrium loses
stability for λ = λdc > λ0 in a Γ-equivariant bifurcation along the dissensus
space, where λdc satisfies
α¯(λdc)− β¯(λdc)− γ¯(λdc) + δ¯(λdc) = 1.
Remark 2.12. When γ¯ ≡ δ¯, bifurcations along the consensus and dissensus space
happen simultaneously, a phenomenon called mode interaction. A rigorous analysis of
mode interaction was worked out only in the lowest dimensional case Na = No = 2 [34,
Chapter X]. We do not address mode interaction further in the present work. See [5]
for an analysis of opinion formation between two agents and two options.
Proof. Let J := ∂G∂X (O). A simple computation shows that
J :=

B0 B1 · · · B1
B1
. . .
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
. . . B1
B1 · · · B1 B0
, where B0 =

a b · · · b
b
. . .
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
. . . b
b · · · b a
, B1 =

c d · · · d
d
. . .
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
. . . d
d · · · d c
,
and a = No−1No (−1 + α¯− β¯), b = − aNo−1 , c = No−1No (γ¯ − δ¯), d = − cNo−1 . Because
Wc and Wd are non-isomorphic irreducible representations of Γ, it follows by [35,
Theorem 2.12] that J can be block-diagonalized with respect toWc andWd. Moreover,
generically [35, Theorem 1.27], J |Wi = ci(λ)I, i = c, d. To find ci(λ), i = 1, 2, let
Xagree ∈Wc and Xdisagree ∈Wd. Then, computing, we get
J Xagree = (No − 1)(−1 + α¯− β¯ + (Na − 1)(γ¯ − δ¯))Xagree,
which gives c1 = (No − 1)(−1 + α¯− β¯ + (Na − 1)(γ¯ − δ¯)), and
J Xdisagree = (No − 1)(Na − 1)(−1 + α¯− β¯ − γ¯ + δ¯)Xdisagree,
which gives c2 = (No− 1)(Na− 1)(−1 + α¯− β¯− γ¯+ δ¯). If (2.16) is satisfied, then the
eigenvalue along the consensus and the eigenvalue along the dissensus space are both
negative and thus the neutral state is stable. If γ¯(λ) > δ¯(λ), then c1 > c2 and the
monotonicity assumptions imposed on α¯(λ)− β¯(λ) and γ¯(λ)− δ¯(λ) ensure that there
must exist λac such that c1(λ
a
c ) = 0 with c
′
1(λ
a
c ) > 0. This implies a non-degenerate
equivariant bifurcation along the consensus space. If γ¯(λ) < δ¯(λ), then c1 < c2 and
the imposed monotonicity assumptions ensure that there must exists λdc such that
c2(λ
d
c) = 0 with c
′
2(λ
d
c) > 0. This implies a non-degenerate equivariant bifurcation
along the dissensus space.
We now interpret Theorem 2.11 from the perspective of agents’ cooperativity/competitivity,
as defined below, and then illustrate the prediction in our numerical realization (2.10).
The key parameter to determine whether bifurcations happen along the consensus
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space or along the dissensus space is the difference γ¯ − δ¯. Recall that γ¯ = ∂G˜ij∂xkj
∣∣∣
O
quantifies how much the opinion of agent i for option j is influenced by other agents’
opinions for the same option, whereas δ¯ =
∂G˜ij
∂xkl
∣∣∣
O
quantifies how much the opinion
of agent i for option j is influenced by other agents’ opinions for the other options. If
γ¯ > δ¯, the opinion of agent i for option j will tend to align to other agents’ opinions
for the same option. The agents behave cooperatively, thus leading to consensus. If
γ¯ < δ¯, the opinion of agent i for option j will instead tend to align with the average
opinion of the other agents for all the other options. Because options are mutually
exclusive (2.1), this implies that if on average the other agents’ opinion for option j
increases then the opinion of agent i for option j will decrease. The agents behave
competitively, thus leading to dissensus.
Figure 4 illustrates our prediction in the analytical model (2.11) for Na = 17
and No = 3. In this model, the value of λ
a
c and λ
d
c , as defined in the statement of
Theorem 4.6, can easily be computed by observing that in model (2.11)
α¯ = λα, β¯ = λβ, γ¯ = λγ, δ¯ = λδ.
Thus, for γ > δ and α− β > 0, consensus bifurcations happen for
λ = λac = (α− β + (Na − 1)(γ − δ))−1.
For γ < δ and α− β > 0, dissensus bifurcations happen for
λ = λdc = (α− β − γ + δ))−1.
We stress that in all the simulations presented in Figure 4 and in subsequent figures
small random agents’ biases and coupling heterogeneities were added to weakly violate
the Γ-equivariance assumption. Our theoretical predictions remain robustly true.
Remark 2.13. With similar computations, Theorem 2.11 and its specialization
to model (2.10) can be extended to the case in which Γ = Γa × Γo, with Γa ⊂ SNa
acting transitively on {1, . . . , Na}. The resulting critical values, at which consensus or
dissensus bifurcations happen, will of course depend on the specific symmetry groups.
2.6. Moderate and extremist opinions arise from symmetry. Another
model-independent prediction of our theory is that, generically, dissensus can appear
in only two forms: uniform dissensus and moderate/extremist dissensus. Figure 5 illus-
trates this model-independent fact in the model (2.11). In a uniform dissensus state
(Figure 5a), the agents’ opinions are uniformly spread across well-defined clusters,
each cluster rejecting a different option with the same strength. On the contrary, in a
moderate/extremist dissensus state (Figure 5b) the agents’ opinions are spread across
the options in an asymmetric fashion. A small group of agents, the extremists, develop
a strong opinion rejecting one of the options. A larger group of agents, the moderates,
develop a diametrically opposed opinion as compared to the extremists but with a
weaker strength. In Figure 5b, the extremists’ opinion in rejection for Option 2 is so
strong that consensus is not possible although a larger group of agents agree in favor-
ing that option. The numerical explorations we performed on our analytical model
suggest that moderate/extremist dissensus happens as a stable or meta-stable state4
4We have not been able to find parameter combinations for which moderate/extremist dissensus
is stable in the proposed model. This observation is however likely to be model-dependent, in the
sense that in other realizations of the equivariant opinion formation dynamics this dissensus state
might be stable for suitable parameter choices.
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Fig. 4. a) Bifurcation to consensus (top) or to dissensus (bottom) in model (2.11). When
γ > δ (top), a consensus bifurcation, leading to a group consensus state, happens at the critical value
λ = λac . The neutral state is stable for λ < λ
a
c and unstable for λ > λ
a
c . When γ < δ (bottom), a
dissensus bifurcation, leading to a group dissensus state, happens at the critical value λ = λdc . The
neutral state is stable for λ < λdc and unstable for λ > λ
d
c . In each plot, the agents’ opinion states
are color-coded to reflect the option favored at steady state. Initial conditions are randomly picked
and are depicted by the light gray circles. The agents’ opinion trajectories are depicted by the thin
black lines. b) Time evolution of agents’ opinion xi1, xi2, xi3, i = 1, . . . , 17, in model (2.11) for the
same parameters as in a) but with λ smoothly increasing from below to above the bifurcation critical
value. Parameters: for consensus, α = 0, β = −1.5, γ = 0.2, δ = 0.1, λ = λac ± 0.05; for dissensus,
α = 0, β = −0.5, γ = 0.1, δ = 0.2, λ = λdc ± 0.05; in b), λ(t) = λa,dc − 0.2 + 0.4t/2000.
at transition between uniform dissensus and consensus, i.e., for γ < δ, γ ≈ δ, whereas
for γ sufficiently smaller than δ only uniform dissensus is observed. To rigorously
analyze stability properties of this dissensus state in a model-independent fashion one
needs to develop equivariant singularity theory for Sn × Sk-equivariant bifurcations,
n, k ≥ 3, which is a hard problem, likely to be intractable in general5.
Uniform and moderate/extremist dissensus arise in our theory as the axial sub-
groups of the action of the opinion-formation dynamics symmetry group inside the
dissensus space. Equivariant bifurcation theory predicts that, generically, the sym-
metry group of the equilibria appearing at a bifurcation from the neutral state must
be an axial subgroup. We also conveyed this genericity result in Figure 3, where the
two sketched branches of dissensus states (d1-d2 and d3-d4) correspond to uniform
dissensus and to moderate/extremist dissensus, respectively. In Sections 5 and 6, we
provide a rigorous discussion and proofs of this generic fact.
Remark 2.14. The results presented in this section do not generalize to the case
in which the opinion dynamics has symmetry Γ = Γa × Γo, with transitive Γa ⊂
SNa and Γo ⊂ SNo . The genericity of uniform and moderate/extremist dissensus
depends indeed on the specific dissensus axial subgroup structure and, thus, might no
generalize to other symmetry groups.
2.7. The “switchiness” of opinion formation depends on the number of
agents and the number of options. Opinion formation (either toward consensus
or toward dissensus) can happen in two qualitatively distinct manners: 1) continuous
5Equivariant singularity theory has been rigorously developed only in a handful of cases, i.e., the
ones analyzed in [36].
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Fig. 5. Uniform dissensus (left), moderate/extremist dissensus (center), and consensus (right).
In the uniform dissensus state, agents’ opinions diverge from the neutral state to form three sharply
separated clusters, one for each option, each with roughly the same number of agents and the same
opinion strength. In the moderate/extremist dissensus state, agents’ opinions diverge from the
neutral state in an asymmetric fashion. One small cluster, the extremists (purple), takes a strong
stance in disfavor of one of the options. A larger cluster, the moderates (green), maintain a more
moderate stance in opposition to the opinion of the extremists. In consensus, all agents favor
the same option. Parameters: α = 1.1, β = −1.0, γ = 0.05, δ(t) = 5γ/4 − γt/(8000), λ(t) =
0.01 + (α− β − γ + δ(t))−1, if γ < δ(t), λ(t) = 0.01 + (α− β + (Na − 1)(γ − δ(t)))−1, if γ > δ(t).
formation and 2) switch-like formation. In the continuous case, the agents’ opinions
change continuously as a function of the bifurcation parameter, including at the pas-
sage through the bifurcation point at which the neutral state loses stability. In the
switch-like case, at the passage through the bifurcation point, the agents’ opinions
change abruptly as a function of the bifurcation parameter: when the neutral state
loses stability, the agents’ opinions switch to a new opinion state almost discontinu-
ously.
Figure 6 illustrates these two possible behaviors for both consensus and dissensus
bifurcations for two and three options in a group ofNa = 17 agents. In the simulations,
the bifurcation parameter is slowly increased through the critical value at which the
neutral state loses stability. In the case of a consensus bifurcation (Figure 6 a1 and b1)
and a dissensus bifurcation (Figure 6 a2 and b2), there is a clear difference between the
two-option scenario (a1,a2) and the three-option scenario (b1,b2). In the two-option
scenario, opinion formation is continuous. As the bifurcation parameter increases, the
agents’ opinions change slowly and continuously in time in favor of Option 1 (a1) or to
a dissensus state (a2). In the three-option scenario, when the bifurcation parameter
crosses the critical value, the agents’ opinions exhibit a jump in favor of Option 2 (b1)
or toward a dissensus state (b2).
Of course, as for the solution of any smooth dynamical system, none of the dy-
namical behaviors described above is actually discontinuous. What engenders either
a switch-like or a continuous opinion-formation behavior is how the stable opinion
equilibria change as a function of the bifurcation parameter (Figure 6 a3 and b3).
In continuous opinion formation, some of the opinion branches bifurcating from the
neutral equilibrium are made of stable equilibria. In this case, the agents’ opinion
state slides along these stable equilibrium branches continuously away from the neu-
tral equilibrium. In switch-like opinion formation, all the opinion branches bifurcating
from the neutral equilibrium are made of unstable equilibria. The agents’ opinion state
is thus obliged to jump to a new stable opinion state far from the neutral equilibrium,
which engenders the switch-like opinion-formation behavior. Our theory predicts that
consensus opinion formation is always switch-like for No ≥ 3. We also predict that
dissensus opinion formation is always switch-like when NoNa ≥ 9 (See Section 6.1 for
details). Consensus opinion formation with No = 2 is continuous when the organizing
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Fig. 6. Switch-like (b1,b2) versus continuous (a1,a2) opinion formation. When No = 2
(a1,a2), both consensus and dissensus opinion formation are continuous. As the bifurcation param-
eter is slowly increased through the critical value at which the neutral state becomes unstable, the
agents’ opinion state continuously follows a bifurcation branch of stable equilibria. When No = 3
(b1,b2), both consensus and dissensus opinion formation are switch-like. As the bifurcation pa-
rameter is slowly increased through the critical value at which the neutral state becomes unstable,
the agents’ opinion state jumps away from it and switches to a novel, distinct opinion state be-
cause no stable steady state branches appear at the bifurcation. Bifurcation diagram interpretation
of continuous (a3) and switch-like (b3) opinion formation. Solid bifurcation branches are stable
and dashed bifurcation branches are unstable. Parameters: α = 0, β = −1.5, γ = 0.2, δ = 0.1,
λ(t) = (α−β+(Na−1)(γ−δ))−0.2+0.4t/10000, for consensus; α = 0, β = −0.5, γ = 0.1, δ = 0.2,
λ(t) = (α− β − γ + δ)− 0.2 + 0.4t/10000, for dissensus.
bifurcation is a supercritical pitchfork and switch-like when the organizing bifurcation
is a subcritical pitchfork [39]. Similarly, for NoNa ≤ 6, dissensus opinion formation
can be either continuous or switch-like depending on whether the organizing pitchfork
bifurcations are supercritical or subcritical.
Remark 2.15. The results presented in this section also do not generalize to the
case in which the opinion dynamics has symmetry Γ = Γa × Γo, with transitive
Γa ⊂ SNa and Γo ⊂ SNo . Stability of bifurcation branches is indeed dependent on the
properties of the symmetry group action inside the consensus and dissensus space, in
particular, the existence of consensus or dissensus quadratic equivariants.
3. Some applications of the theory.
3.1. Animal groups group decision making and motion. Animal groups
that are social often make collective decisions when they forage, reproduce, avoid
threats, and, eventually, survive. Honeybee colonies have been studied in fine be-
havioral detail during the critical period in which a decision is made on the location
of a new nest [76]. Studies have revealed a rich repertoire of signals through which
honeybees express preferences, convince others, and eventually, come to a democratic
consensus on one of the alternatives. Some animal groups must also make decisions
rapidly while in motion. Examples include groups of strongly schooling fish that
must collectively decide in which direction to swim without splitting the group (for
instance, in the presence of two spatially separated sources of food or when a predator
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approaches them) [16].
In various works [52, 15, 69, 77, 70, 39, 66, 62], animal group collective decision
making has been mathematically described as a bifurcation phenomenon, where the
state variables describe the opinion state of the group and the bifurcation parame-
ter capture example-specific properties of the decision-making process. For instance,
in the case of honeybee decision making, the bifurcation parameter is mostly re-
lated to the quality of the alternatives [66], whereas for animal groups in motion, the
bifurcation parameter is mainly related to the geometry of the alternatives (e.g.,
their distance to the group or their location relative to the group motion direc-
tion) [15, 16, 52, 69].
The model-independent theoretical framework and the analytical realization (2.10)
developed here capture and generalize all the aforementioned modeling efforts. The
possibility of making rigorous predictions about decision-making behaviors in ani-
mal groups at the single agent level, for an arbitrary number of agents, an arbitrary
number of options, and for both consensus and dissensus outcomes, is new. Previous
analytical models of animal group decision making either make mean-field approxima-
tions (i.e., average out the agent level), focus on consensus only, or restrict to the two
alternative case. Overcoming these limitations might open novel interaction paths
between experimental and theoretical studies of decision making in animal groups as
well as providing the basis to formally translate animal group behavior into artificial
multi-agent systems.
3.2. Cognitive neuroscience. Low-level perceptual decision making refers to
the cognitive phenomenon of distinguishing between two (or more), usually incompat-
ible, perceptual alternatives. Low-level perceptual decision making can be exemplified
by the classical random dot experiment [87]. This type of decision making happens
fast (< 1s) and is implemented in sensory and motor cortices without requiring either
short-term (working) or long-term memory, or any form of “abstract thinking”.
Behavioral data obtained from the random-dot experiment is usually explained
using phenomenological models, like accumulator, counter, or race models of decision-
making [8]. In these models, noisy evidence for perceptual alternatives accumulates
by integration until some threshold is reached. Although some experimental evidence
of perceptual integration has been found in mean-field (coarse) measures of neuronal
activity [41], phenomenological models fail to capture the neuronal mechanisms un-
derlying perceptual decision making at the cellular and circuit level.
Attractor network models constitute a more biologically-grounded alternative to
understand the mechanisms behind low-level perceptual decision making, in particu-
lar, when basic properties of biological neuronal networks (such as, recurrent connec-
tions and intrinsic and synaptic short-term plasticity) are taken into account. In these
models, decision making happens as bifurcations between basal/indecisive states and
excited decision states (see [18] for a review of attractor network models of perceptual
decision making). Interestingly, recent work on cognitive control [61] and binocular
rivalry [21] suggests that similar models also describe higher-level decision making (for
instance, allocation of cognitive efforts in a multi-task setting or interpretation of am-
biguous binocular visual stimuli). This observation suggests a seemingly overlooked
connection between low- and high-level decision making in the brain.
The model-independent theory we are proposing, together with the analytical re-
alization (2.10), provide the means to start the rigorous exploration of multi-alternative
(more than two) perceptual decision making. There are indeed considerable qualita-
tive differences between two and three option decision making in terms of the continu-
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ous or swtich-like nature of opinion formation. Because of this fundamental difference,
we believe that moving from two to three options in perceptual decision making could
provide a novel source of knowledge in understanding brain dynamics.
3.3. Socio-political opinion networks. A growing body of literature is study-
ing opinion formation in socio-political networks from a mathematical modeling per-
spective [12, 24, 53, 79, 84, 27, 63, 68, 1, 6, 20, 29, 42, 90, 46, 45, 54, 67, 31, 30, 13, 19].
One of the reasons for this growing interest in socio-political opinion networks is the
increasing occurrence, during the last decades, of polarized political debate, both at
the elite and voter level [58]. For the sake of this paper, what is meant by polarization
is probably best illustrated with an example. During decades of political debate about,
for example, abortion, the electorate opinion in the United States about the subject
(strongly disfavor, disfavor, weakly disfavor, neutral, weakly favor, favor, strongly fa-
vor) changed from most of the Democrats (Republicans) having moderate opinions in
favor (disfavor) of abortion to most of the Democrats (Republicans) having extreme
opinions in favor (disfavor) of abortion [60, 44].
Various modeling approaches bring different mechanistic accounts for the possible
origin of polarized political discourse. In bounded confidence models [19, 42, 42,
63, 54], for instance, the appearance of polarization is mainly determined by the
model initial conditions, representing the agents’ priori beliefs. In linear consensus-like
models [1, 67, 13], a specific form of polarization, called bipartite consensus, emerge
from specific signed network topologies, called structurally balanced networks.
Our model-independent approach reconciles these modeling efforts. For instance,
our model becomes sensitive to initial conditions if the bifurcation parameter is al-
ready beyond the singularity. In this regime, the model is multistable, with each
attractor corresponding to a different (consensus or dissensus) opinion configuration.
In the dissensus regime, moderate prior beliefs (i.e., initial conditions close to neutral)
lead to polarized (i.e., much further away from neutral) final opinions in one of the
dissensus states predicted by the equivariant theory. At the same time, as explained
in Remarks 2.4 and 2.7, our equivariant approach naturally accommodates structured
interaction topologies (for instance, structurally balanced ones) by suitably changing
the model symmetry group. Our modeling approach is thus able to unify bounded-
confidence, linear/structurally balanced, and maybe other, opinion network models in
a single theoretical framework. This might allow for a more rigorous comparison be-
tween different hypothesis and theories about the origin of polarized political debates,
as well as other questions in socio-political opinion network dynamics.
3.4. Phenotypic decision making. The universal biological phenomenon of
phenotypic differentiation provides a wide-spread example of dissensus decision mak-
ing and opinion formation. A change in phenotype at the single cell level can be
seen as a cellular decision-making process realized through the creation of, disappear-
ance of, and transition between, different attractors of the cell molecular regulatory
network [3, 89, 56]. In social micro-organisms, group fitness is increased when cells
undergo phenotypic differentiation and make cellular decisions in a coordinated fash-
ion. Typical examples are bacterial groups reacting with phenotypic differentiation in
response to environmental stressors, like the presence of antibiotics [9] or the scarcity
of nutrients [72], via quorum sensing [59, 75].
The collective decision-making process associated with phenotypic differentiation
is of the dissensus type because different cells make different decisions, i.e., they tran-
sition to different phenotypes. The theory developed in the present paper provides
a novel theoretical framework to support experimental research in phenotypic differ-
A MODEL-INDEPENDENT THEORY OF CONSENSUS AND DISSENSUS 21
entiation and, more generally, collective decision making in social microorganisms.
Over long (multiple generation) timescales and when averaging out the cellular level,
phenotypic differentiation can lead to speciation via natural selection. Equivariant
bifurcation theory was successfully applied in modeling speciation [80]. It may be
possible to generalize this idea to the temporal and spatial scales of single cells react-
ing in real time to the environment.
3.5. Distributed dynamic task-allocation. In collective robotic systems, each
agent represents a robot and the No options represent a set of No possible tasks to be
accomplished by the robot swarm. Each robot must dynamically (i.e., in real time)
decide which task to accomplish in a distributed fashion, that is, solely relying on the
information collected through its sensors, the information received by other robots in
the swarm, and without a centralized controller [4, 48, 10]. Agents’ opinions represent
each robot’s “motivation” to develop a given task. To achieve an efficient distribution
of labor, different robots could be motivated to accomplish different tasks. In terms of
our opinion formation theory, dissensus could thus be a natural state for a distributed
dynamic task-allocation problem.
The idea of using nonlinear opinion formation dynamics to realize dynamic task
allocation in robotic systems was originally proposed in [71] in the case of a single
robot deciding over two possible tasks. The key ideas in [71] are the following. The
robot actions happen in the physical space, which evolves dynamically in continuous
time. Representing the robot’s motivational and decision state in continuously evolv-
ing dynamical variables creates novel design possibilities with respect to more classical
logic- and optimization-based approaches. Namely, it creates the possibility of suit-
ably coupling the physical world dynamics with the robot’s motivational dynamics
in real time without requiring any hybrid dynamic/logic or continuous/discrete in-
terface. Our theoretical framework and vector field realization provide the means to
extend these ideas to multi-robot, multi-task problems.
4. An introduction to equivariant bifurcation theory and its application
to consensus and dissensus. This section is divided into three parts. First, we
introduce the background needed to formalize the symmetry-based analysis of opinion
formation. Then we discuss the equivariant branching lemma, the basic result for
finding symmetry-breaking solutions in equivariant bifurcation problems. Finally, we
use symmetry-breaking to set up the analysis of consensus and dissensus solutions.
4.1. Fixed-point subspaces and isotropy subgroups. Symmetries of a sys-
tem of differential equations are invertible linear maps that take solutions to solutions.
More specifically, let
(4.1) x˙ = G(x)
where x ∈ Rm and G : Rm → Rm. Then the invertible linear map γ : Rm → Rm
takes solutions to solutions if and only if G is γ-equivariant; that is,
G(γx) = γG(x) ∀x ∈ Rm.
Let Γ be the group of symmetries of G; we say that G is Γ-equivariant.
The key idea in finding equilibria of equivariant systems (4.1) is the symmetry
forced existence of flow-invariant subspaces.
Definition 4.1. Let Γ be a group acting on Rm and let Σ ∈ Γ be a subgroup.
The fixed-point subspace of Σ is
Fix(Σ) = {x ∈ Rm : γx = x ∀γ ∈ Γ}
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Observe that Fix(Σ) is a vector subspace of Rm. We claim that G : Fix(Σ)→ Fix(Σ).
The proof is short. Suppose that x ∈ Fix(Σ). Then G(x) = G(σx) = σG(x) for all
σ ∈ Σ. It follows that G(x) ∈ Fix(Σ).
It follows that we can find solutions to G = 0 by searching for solutions to
G|Fix(Σ) = 0 for subgroups Σ with a certain special symmetry property; and this is
the approach that we take.
A point x ∈ Rn has symmetry group Σx ⊂ Γ where σ ∈ Σx if and only if
σx = x. Technically, Σx is called the isotropy subgroup of x. As we next explain, the
important idea from equivariant bifurcation theory is that certain isotropy subgroups
(called axial subgroups) generically lead to families of equilibria with symmetry Σx.
Thus, the analytic problem of finding equilibria to systems of differential equations is
reduced to the algebraic problem of finding axial subgroups.
4.2. Equivariant bifurcation theory. Bifurcation theory assumes that the
vector field G in (4.1) depends explicitly on a parameter λ. That is, we assume
(4.2) x˙ = G(x, λ)
where x ∈ Rm, λ ∈ R, and G : Rm × R → Rm. In equivariant bifurcation theory, we
assume G is Γ-equivariant; that is, G(γx, λ) = γG(x, λ) for all γ ∈ Γ.
Moreover, suppose Fix(Γ) = {0} (which happens when Γ acts irreducibly on Rm).
Then the subspace {0} is flow-invariant and G(0, λ) = 0 for all λ. We say that x = 0
is a trivial equilibrium and we will look for branches of solutions that bifurcate from
the trivial equilibrium.
Bifurcation from the trivial solution occurs at λ0 if the Jacobian J(λ0) = dG(0, λ0)
is singular. Let V be the kernel of J(λ0). The subspace V is Γ-invariant and generi-
cally, V is an absolutely irreducible representation of Γ. That is:
Definition 4.2. A group Γ acts absolutely irreducibly on the subspace V if the
only linear maps on V that commute with Γ are multiples of the identity.
Without loss of generality we can assume that λ0 = 0. The chain rule implies
that J(λ) commutes with Γ and absolute irreducibility implies that J(λ) = c(λ)Im.
It follows that steady-state bifurcation occurs at λ = 0 if and only if c(0) = 0.
The equivariant branching lemma provides the basic tool for finding branches of
bifurcating solutions in Γ-equivariant bifurcation problems. Before stating this lemma
we present the central definition in the theory.
Definition 4.3. Let x ∈ Rm and Γ act on Rm. The isotropy subgroup Σx is
axial if dim Fix(Σx) = 1.
Lemma 4.4 (Equivariant Branching Lemma). Assume Γ acts absolutely
irreducibly on Rm and G : Rm × R→ Rm is Γ-equivariant. Then
G(0, λ) ≡ 0
(dG)(0,λ) = c(λ)Im
Assume the bifurcation condition c(0) = 0 and the non-degeneracy condition c′0) 6=
0. Then, for every axial subgroup Σ ⊂ Γ there exists a unique branch of solutions
to G(x, λ) = 0 emanating from (0, 0), where the symmetry group of the bifurcating
solutions is Σ.
For each absolutely irreducible representation of Γ, the Equivariant Branching
Lemma determines branches of solutions that correspond to axial subgroups of Γ.
There may be solutions with non-axial symmetry that bifurcate from the origin for
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an open set of bifurcation problems [25], but the axial solutions are the ones that
occur on an open dense set of bifurcation problems. Moreover, the axial subgroups
and their fixed-point subspaces provide the easiest way to determine equilibria.
The following results [35, Lemma 1.31] help explain why the equivariant branching
lemma is so useful.
Theorem 4.5. Let Γ be a compact Lie group. Suppose the equivariant bifurcation
problem G has a steady-state bifurcation from x = 0 at λ0 = 0. Then A0 = (dG)0,0
has a 0 eigenvalue and the following results hold generically.
(a) 0 is the only eigenvalue of A0 on the imaginary axis.
(b) The generalized eigenspace corresponding to 0 is ker A0.
(c) Γ acts absolutely irreducibly on ker A0.
The Lyapunov-Schmidt reduction [35, Section 1.3] ensures that we can reduce
the Γ-equivariant bifurcation problem to ker A0 preserving Γ equivariance and Theo-
rem 4.5 ensures that, in doing so, the action of Γ on ker A0 is absolutely irreducible.
4.3. Consensus and dissensus bifurcations. Given this background we will
prove that consensus and dissensus are the only generic symmetry-breaking opinion
formation behaviors.
Recall that agent permutations SNa acts on V by permuting the agent axes, that
is, if σ ∈ SNa ,
σX = (Xσ−1(1), . . . ,Xσ−1(Na))
Options permutations SNo acts diagonally on V, that is, if τ ∈ SNo ,
τX = (τX1, . . . , τXNa), τXi = (xiτ−1(1), . . . , xiτ−1(No)).
Representing this action in the shifted (linearized) variables Z, defined by (2.4), we
obtain a representation of Γ = SNa×SNo on the linear space V = TOV ∼= RNo−1⊗RNa .
The equivariant analysis will be developed in this linear representation.
The given action of SNo on each Vi = TOi∆ is isomorphic to the standard action
of SNo on RNo−1. In particular, FixVi(SNo) = {0}.
In the original coordinates on the simplex, this means that the fixed point set of
the option symmetries in the option space ∆ of each agent i is exactly the neutral
point (2.3). Because SNo acts diagonally, the fixed-point subset of 1× SNo ⊂ Γ in V
is FixV (1× SNo) = {0}. It follows that
(4.3) FixV (Γ) = {0}.
Our model has symmetry Γ in the following sense. The opinion formation dy-
namics (2.7) maps in an affine way to a opinion formation dynamics on V defined
by
(4.4) Z˙ = G(Z, λ),
where G : V ×R→ V 6. Our symmetry assumption is formalized by requiring that G
is Γ-equivariant. We study the associated equivariant bifurcation problem
(4.5) G(Z, λ) = 0.
6Note that, with a small abuse of notation, we are denoting the vector field on the tangent space
V with the same letter as the vector filed on the base space V.
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Invoking (4.3) and [35, Theorem 1.17], it follows that the origin is a solution of the
bifurcation problem (4.5) for all λ, that is,
G(0, λ) ≡ 0.
We call the origin the trivial equilibrium. Note that in the original opinion formation
coordinates X the trivial equilibrium is exactly the neutral point O. Our goal is to
study symmetry-breaking from the trivial equilibrium. In doing so, we mainly rely
on the Equivariant Branching Lemma [35, Lemma 1.31],[36, Theorem 3.3].
The first step in applying the Equivariant Branching Lemma is to decompose the
state space into the direct sum of irreducible representations. A group representation
on a given vector space is irreducible if the only invariant subspace with respect to
the group action is the origin (see [36, Section XII.2],[35, Definition 1.21]). In our
case, we can write
V = Wc ⊕Wd
where Wc and Wd are the consensus and dissensus space defined in (2.12) and (2.13),
respectively. It is easy to verify that both Wc and Wd are irreducible representations of
Γ. Moreover SNa acts trivially on Wc but faithfully on Wd, whereas SNo acts faithfully
on both spaces. It follows that the actions of Γ on Wc and Wd are not isomorphic.
Because Wc ⊕Wd = V , [36, Corollary XII.2.6(a)] implies that no other Γ-irreducible
representations exist. Absolute irreducibility implies that there is a trivial equilibrium
for every equivariant bifurcation problem.
Going back to symmetry breaking in decision making, we can conclude that,
generically, there are two types of symmetry breaking bifurcations of (2.7).
Theorem 4.6. Suppose that (2.7) is Γ-equivariant. Then generically symmetry
breaking either happens along the consensus space (which corresponds to kerA0 = Wc)
or along the dissensus space (which corresponds to kerA0 = Wd).
Note that, generically, the two types do not occur together, that is, either one type
of bifurcation is observed or the other. The analysis in Section 2.5 determines which
type occurs. To determine the structure of the bifurcating branches appearing inside
either mode, we can apply the Equivariant Branching Lemma.
Remark 4.7. The result of Theorem 4.6 generalizes to the case in which Γ =
Γa × Γo, with Γa ⊂ SNa and Γo ⊂ SNo such that Γa acts transitively on {1, . . . , Na}.
Transitivity of the agent factor of the symmetry group Γa means that all agents
can be sent into all other agents by the symmetry group action. In other words,
transitivity generalizes the condition that all agents are equivalent by asking that any
agent can be sent into any other agent by the symmetry group action, although it
might not be possible to do so by simply swapping arbitrary pairs of agents as in
the fully symmetric case. This means that there are no apriori defined clusters of
distinguishable agents. As a relevant example, consider the case in which Γa = DNa ,
the dihedral group of order Na. Geometrically, this means that the agent and their
interactions are organized as a regular polygon with Na vertices. DNa is transitive
and indeed it is possible to send any agent into any other agent, for instance, by
cycling them forward. Agents are equal. However, if Na > 3, DNa does not contain
all simple permutations (i j), i, j ∈ {1, . . . , Na}, i 6= j, so not every pair of agents can
be swapped while leaving the opinion formation dynamics unchanged. An example of
a non-transitive Γa is Γa = Sn1 × Sn2 , n1 + n2 = Na, corresponding to two clusters
of agents, with the n1 agents in the first cluster distinguished from the n2 agents in
the second cluster. Agents in the first clusters cannot be sent to agents in the second
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cluster by the symmetry group action, reflecting the distinguished nature of the two
groups. A concrete situation in which such symmetry might arise is when the first
cluster of agents is influenced by the opinion of the agents in the second cluster, but
not vice-versa, a lack of symmetry in the interaction topology which makes the two
groups distinguished.
We now prove the statement of this remark. By [22, Proposition 2.4], absolutely
irreducible representations of the action of Γ on V are of the form W ai ⊗W oj , with
W ai ⊂ RNa , W a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕W as = RNa , absolutely irreducible representations of Γa on
RNa , and W oi ⊂ VNo , W a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕W ar = VNo , absolutely irreducible representations of
Γo on VNo . The action of Γa on RNa always admits a trivial irreducible representation
on W a1 = R{(1, . . . , 1)}. Because Γa is transitive, no other trivial representations
of Γa on RNa exist and, in particular, W aj is not Γa-isomorphic to W a1 for any j >
1. Furthermore, VNa is Γa-invariant, so all other isotypic components (and thus
all other irreducible representations) of Γa are contained in VNa . It follows that
when Γa is transitive on {1, . . . , Na} the absolutely irreducible representations of Γ
appear in two types: consensus irreducible representations, W o1 , . . . ,W
o
r ⊂ Wc, and
dissensus irreducible representations W ai ⊗W o1 , . . . ,W ai ⊗W oNo ⊂Wd, i = 2, . . . , s. The
generalization of Theorem 4.6 follows easily from isotypic components techniques [35,
Section 2.2],[36, Section XII.2].
In the following, we only develop the equivariant analysis for the fully symmetric
case Γ = SNa × SNo . Axial subgroups and, thus, the structure of consensus and
dissensus bifurcation branches for lower-symmetry cases can be similarly constructed.
5. Opinion formation for Na = 2 or No = 2. We now apply the Equivariant
Branching Lemma to various opinion-forming problems with either Na = 2 or No = 2.
All of the relevant equivariant bifurcation results used in this section were previously
derived [2],[36, Section XIII.5],[36, Chapter X]. We interpret them in terms of opinion
formation. In the remainder of the paper, we set the opinion threshold ϑ = 0. With
this choice, the only unopinionated state of an agent i is exactly its neutral point Oi
and an agent is conflicted between two or more options when her opinion about them is
exactly the same. This choice allows a precise mapping between the theoretical results
and their interpretation in terms of opinion formation. A positive ϑ can always be
plugged back to make the interpretation robust to heterogeneities and other small
perturbations to the exact symmetry assumption, as it was done for the numerical
illustrations in Figures 4,5,6. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the algebraic data underlying
the analysis of consensus and dissensus opinion formation developed in this section.
The case Na = No = 2 is analyzed in in [5] in terms of two clusters of agents deciding
over two options. It won’t be considered here.
5.1. Three agents and two options. When Na = 3 and No = 2 the state
space is isomorphic to R3. Each agent state-space is isomorphic to the real line
with positive and negative values associated to preferring either of the options. The
consensus space is thus one-dimensional and inside this space the symmetry group
action reduces to the standard action of Z2 in R, as defined in Table 1. Consensus
opinion formation is therefore organized by the generic Z2-equivariant bifurcation, the
pitchfork (Figure 7a1). The two bifurcating branches correspond to the three agent
agreeing on one of the two options (Figure 7a2).
The dissensus space is isomorphic to the subspace V3 ⊂ R3 where the coordinate
sum is zero, as defined in (2.5), and it is isomorphic to R2. The action of the symmetry
group in this subspace is the standard action of S3 × Z2 ∼= D6 on R2, as defined in
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Fig. 7. Consensus (a) and dissensus (b) opinion formation between 3 agents and 2 options.
a1,b1) Equivariant bifurcation diagrams. Dashed branches are unstable, full branches are stable.
The symmetry group of each branch (i.e., its associated axial subgroup) is indicated, unless trivial.
a2,b2) Opinion formation interpretation of the predicted non-trivial bifurcation branches.
Table 2. In this representation, there are two conjugacy classes of axial subgroups [36,
Section XIII.5] and associated conjugacy class of bifurcation branches (Figure 7b1):
Z2(κ) and Z2(τκ). The associated conjugacy classes of one-dimensional fixed point
subspaces are
Fix(Z2(κ)) = {Z1 = Z2 = (c,−c), Z3 = −2Z1, c ∈ R}(5.1a)
Fix(Z2(τκ)) = {Z3 = 0, Z1 = −Z2 = (c,−c), c ∈ R} .(5.1b)
The class Z2(κ) describes the situation in which two agents agree on one of the
two options and the third agent strongly disagree by preferring the other option
(Figure 7b2, top). It is a moderate/extremist situation. The class Z2(τκ) describes
the situation in which one agent is neutral, while the other two agents disagree by
preferring different options (Figure 7b2, bottom). It is a homogeneous dissensus
situation. Depending on second-order terms, the bifurcating branch of either type
of conjugacy classes can be stable, but not both at the same time, as illustrated in
Figure 7b1.
5.2. Two agents and three options. When Na = 2 and No = 3 the state
space is isomorphic to R4. Each agent state space is the two-simplex in R3, which
is locally isomorphic to its tangent space V3 ∼= R2. The consensus subspace is thus
isomorphic to R2 and inside this space the symmetry group action reduces to the
standard action of S3 ∼= D3 on R2, generated in our representation by option per-
mutations as defined in Table 1. Figure 8a1 reproduces a generic D3-equivariant
diagram from [36, Figure XV.4.2] and its two interpretations in terms of consensus
opinion formation. A similar interpretation can be worked out for the other generic
D3-equivariant diagram in [36, Figure XV.4.2]. There is one conjugacy class of axial
subgroups, that is, Z2(κ). The associated conjugacy class of fixed point subspace is
(5.2) Fix(Z2(κ)) = { z11 = z21 = z12 = z22 = c, z13 = z23 = −2c c ∈ R}.
The bifurcating Z2(κ) branch is transcritical, i.e., it is made of one subcritical half-
branch before the bifurcation point and one supercritical half-branch after the sym-
metric bifurcation point. Both branches are unstable at the bifurcation point. Thus,
as discussed in Section 2.7, consensus opinion formation over three options is switch-
like. Equivariant singularity theory [36, Section XV.4] predicts that the subcritical
branch bends in a fold bifurcation away from the symmetric bifurcation point at which
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Fig. 8. Consensus (a) and dissensus (b) opinion formation between 2 agents and 3 options.
a1,b1) Equivariant bifurcation diagrams. Dashed branches are unstable, full branches are stable.
The symmetry group of each branch (i.e., its associated axial subgroup) is indicated, unless trivial.
a2,b2) Opinion formation interpretation of the predicted non-trivial bifurcation branches.
it becomes stable. We expect the opinion state to jump toward this stable branch
at crossing the S3-equivariant singularity. The two bifurcation branches describe two
different opinion configurations: favoring one option (Figure 8a2, right) or to being
conflicted between two options (Figure 8a2, left). The stable opinion configuration
to which the opinion state jumps at crossing the S3-equivariant singularity can corre-
spond to both of them, which leads to two possible opinion formation interpretations
of this axial.
Remark 5.1. S3-equivariant singularity theory further predicts the existence of
secondary bifurcations at which the stable opinion configuration loses stability. In
terms of opinion formation, these secondary bifurcations are the mechanisms through
which an opinionated conflicted state can transition to a state where only one option
is favored. In the three-option consensus case considered here, the stable conflicted
state in Figure 8a2, left, can loose stability in a secondary pitchfork bifurcation that
can either be supercritical or subcritical. In the former (latter) case, the opinion state
continuously changes (switches) to favoring one of the two options between which the
group was conflicted.
The dissensus subspace Wd = V2 ⊗ V3 ∼= R ⊗ V3 = V3 ∼= R2. Indeed, each agent
state space is V3 ∼= R2 and Z1 + Z2 = 0 inside the dissensus space. The symmetry
group action in this subspace is the standard action of Z2×S3 ∼= D6 on R2, as defined
in Table 2. Note that the symmetry group action is isomorphic to the case Na = 3,
No = 2. The conjugacy classes of axial subgroups and associated bifurcation branches
are therefore the same (Figure 8b1). However, the conjugacy classes of fixed point
subspaces and their interpretation are different (Figure 8b2). They are now given by
Fix(Z2(κ)) = {z11 = z12 = −z21 = −z22 = c, z13 = −z23 = −2c, c ∈ R}(5.3a)
Fix(Z2(τκ)) = {z13 = z23 = 0, z11 = −z12 = −z21 = z22 = c, c ∈ R}.(5.3b)
The conjugacy class Fix(Z2(κ)) describes the situation in which one agent favors
one of the three options and the other agent remains conflicted between the other two
options. The conjugacy class Fix(Z2(τκ)) describes the situation in which both agents
remains neutral about one of the three options and each of them favors a different one
between the remaining two options. Depending on second-order terms, both types of
branches can be stable, but not both of them at the same time.
5.3. Consensus opinion formation for an arbitrary number of agents
and arbitrary number of options. For generic Na = n and No = k the consensus
subspace is isomorphic to Rk−1 and the action of Γ on this subspace is the standard
28 A. FRANCI, M. GOLUBITSKY, A. BIZYAEVA, N.E. LEONARD
action of Sk on Vk ∼= Rk−1, as defined in Table 1. There are bk2 c conjugacy classes of
axial subgroups
(5.4) Σp = Sp × Sk−p, p ≤
⌊
k
2
⌋
,
where the first factor permutes the first p options and the second factor permutes the
last k − p options. The associated conjugacy classes of fixed points subspaces are
(5.5) Fix(Σp) =
c(v, . . . , v︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
), v =

p times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k−p
p , . . . ,
k−p
p ,
k−p times︷ ︸︸ ︷
−1, . . . ,−1
 , c ∈ R
 .
For z > 0, this conjugacy class Fix(Σp) corresponds to the situations in which the
agents favor the first p options over the last k−p options. Furthermore, the preference
k−p
p that the agent assign to the favored options increases as p decreases, i.e., the
smaller is the number of favored options the sharper is the way in which the agents
favor them.
Remark 5.2. As in the three option consensus case discussed above (see Re-
mark 5.1), when p ≥ 2, we expect secondary bifurcations to sequentially lead to
smaller and smaller sets of favorite options, eventually reaching consensus on a single
option.
5.4. Dissensus opinion formation for Na = 2 or No = 2. When either
Na = 2 and No = n ≥ 2, or No = 2 and Na = n ≥ 2, the action of Γ on the
dissensus space Wd = Vn ∼= Rn−1 is the action of Sn × Z2 on Vn ∼= Rn−1, as defined
in Table 2. In both cases, the non-trivial element of Z2, corresponding to agent
swapping if Na = 2 or to option swapping if No = 2, can be represented as minus the
identity. The abstract equivariant analysis is thus the same for the two cases and can
be found in [2, Corollary 3.2]. We summarize here the relevant results. Of course,
their interpretation will depend on whether Na = 2 or No = 2.
Partition n into 3 blocks, in such a way that the first two blocks posses 1 ≤ l ≤ n2
elements each and the last block possesses n− 2l elements. Let ρ˜l ∈ Sn swap the first
two blocks of coordinates and define ρl = (ρ˜l,−I) ∈ Sn × Z2.
Theorem 5.3. The conjugacy classes of axial subgroups of Sn×Z2 acting on Vn
and associated conjugacy classes of one-dimensional fixed point subspaces are:
I)
(5.6) Σk = Sk × Sn−k,
1 ≤ k < n2 , where the first factor permutes the first k coordinates and the last
factor permutes the last n− k coordinates, with conjugacy class of fixed point
subspaces
(5.7) Fix(Σk) = R
{( k times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
n−k times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k
k−n , . . . ,
k
k−n
)}
.
II)
(5.8) Tl = Sl × Sl × Sn−2l × Z2(ρl)
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where 1 ≤ l ≤ n2 , with conjugacy class of fixed point subspaces
(5.9) Fix(Tl) = R
{(
1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l times
,−1, . . . ,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l times
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2l times
)}
Generically, only the bifurcation branches corresponding to the axial Σk, with n/3 <
k < n/2 are stable at bifurcation.
Let us interpret Theorem 5.3 in terms of opinion formation. When Na = 2 and
No = n, the fixed point subspace Fix(Σk) describes the situation in which one agent
has opinion 1No +c1, c1 ∈ R about the first k options and opinion 1/No−c2, c2 = c1kn−k
about the last No − k options, while the other agent has opinion 1No − c1 about first
k options and opinion 1/No + c2 about the last No − k options (Figure 9). Suppose
for the definiteness that c1 > 0. The reader can easily work out the interpretation
for c1 < 0. Observe that, for 1 ≤ k < n2 , c1 > c2. Then the first agent has a strong
preference for the first k options while the second agent has a weak preference for
the last No − k options. The first agent behaves with sureness in situations in which
agent decisions are mutually exclusive by giving all its vote to a small number of
options and strongly securing them. The second agent behaves more insecurely, by
securing all the remaining options, but with weaker preference. When No = 2 and
Na = n, the fixed point subspace Fix(Σk) describes the situation in which a small
group of k agents (with opinion 1/2 + c1) strongly favor the first option and a larger
group of Na − k agents (with opinion 1/2− c2) weakly favor the second option. The
elements of the small group can be considered as the extremists, who manage to avoid
consensus for the other option, favored by a larger number of agents, by developing
a strong preference for their favorite option. The elements of the large group can be
considered as the moderates, who do not develop a strong preference but rely on their
large number to try to achieve consensus. This decision behavior is reminiscent of
that observed in schooling fishes [15].
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Fig. 9. Interpretations of the Sn × Z2 axial Σk in terms of dissensus opinion formation. a)
Na = 2. b) No = 2.
A similar interpretation can be worked out for the other axial. When Na = 2
and No = n, the fixed point subspace Fix(Tl) describes the situation in which the
two agents are neutral about the last No − 2l options and conflicted, with exactly
opposite opinions, about the first 2l options. In particular, the first agent favors the
first l options with opinion 1/No + c and disfavors the second l options with opinion
1/No − c, and viceversa for the second agent. When No = 2 and Na = n, the first l
agents equally favor the first option with opinion 1/2 + c, the second l agents equally
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favor the second option with opinion 1/2 − c, and the last Na − 2l agents form an
unopinionated group.
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6. Main theoretical results and their interpretation. We now state the
main theoretical results of the paper and interpret them as needed. The algebraic
data supporting the analysis in Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 are summarized in Table 3.
6.1. Existence of a dissensus quadratic equivariant for Na ≥ 3 and
No ≥ 3. Let Fi : Vi → Vi be the quadratic map defined as
Fi(Zi) =
 No(zi1)
2 − ((zi1)2 + · · ·+ (ziNo)2)
...
No(ziNo)
2 − ((zi1)2 + · · ·+ (ziNo)2)
 .
If No ≥ 3, Fi is not identically zero and SNo-equivariant.
Let F : V → V be the quadratic map defined as
F (Z) =
 NaF1(Z1)− (F1(Z1) + · · ·+ FNa(ZNa))...
NaFNa(ZNa)− (F1(Z1) + · · ·+ FNa(ZNa))

F is Γ-equivariant. Moreover, if Na ≥ 3, F |Wd : Wd →Wd is not identically zero.
It follows that, if Na ≥ 3 and No ≥ 3, there exists a non-zero quadratic equivariant
in the dissensus space. Invoking [35, Theorem 2.14] (see also [36, page 90]), we thus
expect all dissensus branches predicted by the Equivariant Branching Lemma to be
unstable. In turns this implies that dissensus opinion formation is expected to be
switch-like whenever Na ≥ 3 and No ≥ 3.
6.2. Dissensus axials for Na = No = 3. The main difference between the
Na = No = 3 case considered here and the Na · No = 6 considered in Sections 5.1
and 5.2 is that the group S3 × S3 is not isomorphic to any Sk or Dk for any k.
Novel types of axial conjugacy classes appear. Moreover, the existence of a quadratic
equivariant, proved in Section 6.1, implies that all dissensus bifurcation branches are
unstable.
The following theorem classifies the axial subgroups of Γ = S3 × S3 acting on
the dissensus space Wd = V3 ⊗ V3 ∼= R2 ⊗ R2, where one factor of Γ permutes the
agent index and the other factor permutes the option index, as defined in Table 3.
It is a straightforward corollary of the more general Theorem 6.2. Let κa ∈ S3 be
the order two element that swaps the first two agents and κo ∈ S3 be the order two
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Fig. 11. Dissensus decision making between three agents and three options. See text for details.
element that swaps the first two options. Let θa ∈ S3 be the order three element that
cycles forward the agents and θo ∈ S3 be the order three element that cycles forward
the options. Let ρ ∈ S3 × S3 be the order two element defined by ρ = (κa, κo). Let
ν ∈ S3 × S3 be the order three element defined by ν = (θa, θo).
Theorem 6.1. There are two conjugacy classes of axial subgroups for the action
of Γ = S3 × S3 on Wd ∼= R2 ⊗ R2 as defined in Table 3. They are
I)
(6.1) Z2(κ
a)× Z2(κo)
with fixed point subspace
(6.2) Fix(Z2(κ
a)× Z2(κo)) = R {(v3, v3,−2v3)}
where κov3 = v3, that is, v3 =∈ R
{(− 12 ,− 12 , 1)}.
II)
(6.3) Z3(ν)× Z2(ρ)
with fixed point subspace
(6.4) Fix(Z3(ν)× Z2(ρ)) = R {(v1, v2, v3)}
where κov1 = v2, θ
ov1 = v2, (θ
o)2v1 = v3, that is, v1 ∈ R
{(
1,− 12 ,− 12
)}
,
v2 ∈ R
{(− 12 , 1,− 12)}, and v3 ∈ R{(− 12 ,− 12 , 1)}.
Moreover, all the bifurcation branches are unstable.
The interpretation of the two subgroups is provided in Figure 11. The axial
Z2(κ
a) × Z2(κo) describes the situation in which the disagreeing agents form two
clusters (Figure 11a). One is made of two agents, the moderate, that either develop
a weak opinion toward one of the options (right) or remain conflicted between two
options (left). The second cluster is made of one agent, the extremist, that develops
a stronger opinion exactly opposing the moderate cluster. The axial Z3(ν) × Z2(ρ)
describes the situation in which the disagreeing agents develop symmetrically opposed,
but homogeneous in strength, opinions (Figure 11b). They either favor different
options (right), or remain conflicted between different pairs of options (left).
We stress that because all bifurcation branches are unstable the transition from
neutrality to dissensus is discontinuous, as in Figure 6b2. In general, other types of
branches, not predicted by the Equivariant Branching Lemma, might appear at and
away from the singularity. However, such a situation is not generic [25], as opposed
to the Equivariant Branching Lemma, which holds generically. We can therefore
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expect that, similarly to the three-option consensus opinion formation in Figure 6b1
and Figure 8a, the dissensus branches predicted here bend at a fold singularity and
become stable away from the singularity, thus attracting the group decision state.
Simulations reveal that this is the case in the numerical model (2.10).
6.3. Dissensus axials for Na = 3 or No = 3. When either Na = 3 and No =
n ≥ 3, or No = 3 and Na = n ≥ 3, the action of Γ on the dissensus space is the action
of Sn × S3 on Vn ⊗ V3 ∼= Rn−1 ⊗ R2. Each factor of Γ permutes the indices of the
corresponding tensor product factor in the natural way, as defined in Table 3. Note
that the two actions specified in Table 3 for Na = n,No = 3 and for Na = 3, No = n
are the same action. They differ in their interpretation, though, as in one case the
factor Sn permutes the agent indices and the factor S3 permutes the option indices,
and vice-versa for the other case.
Let σm ∈ Sn be the order two element defined as follows. Partition n into
r ≥ 2 blocks such that the first and second blocks have each the same number m of
elements. Let a1, . . . , am and b1, . . . , bm be the elements of the first and second block,
respectively. Define σm as the permutation that swaps the elements of the first and
second block,
(6.5) σm = (a1 b1) · · · (am bm).
Let also ρm ∈ Sn × S3 be the order two element defined as
(6.6) ρm = (σm, κ).
where κ = (1 2) ∈ S3. Let µm ∈ Sn be the order three elements defined as follows.
Partition n into r ≥ 3 blocks such that the first three blocks have each the same
number m of elements. Let a1, . . . , am, b1, . . . , bm, and c1, . . . , cm be the element of
the first, second, and third block, respectively. Define µm as the permutation that
cycles forward the elements of the first three blocks,
(6.7) µm = (a1 b1 c1) · . . . · (am bm cm).
Let νm ∈ Sn × S3 be the order three element defined as
(6.8) νm = (µm, θ),
where θ = (1 2 3) ∈ S3. The following theorem fully characterizes axial subgroups of
Sn × S3 acting on Vn ⊗ V3 ∼= Rn−1 ⊗ R2. Its proof is provided in Section A.
Theorem 6.2. The conjugacy classes of axial subgroups of Sn × S3 acting on
Vn ⊗ V3 as specified in Table 3 are given by:
I)
(6.9) Σ×m = Sm × Sn−m × Z2(κ),
where 1 ≤ m ≤ n/2, with fixed point subspace
(6.10) Fix(Σ×m) = R
{(
v3, . . . , v3︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, mm−nv3, . . . ,
m
m−nv3︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−m times
)}
,
where κv3 = v3, that is, v3 ∈ R
{(− 12 ,− 12 , 1)}.
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II)
(6.11) ΣZ2 = Sn/2 × Sn/2 × Z2(ρn/2),
with fixed point subspace
(6.12) Fix(ΣZ2) = R
{(
v0, . . . , v0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
2 times
,−v0, . . . ,−v0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
2 times
)}
,
where κv0 = −v0, that is, v0 ∈ R{(1,−1, 0)}.
III)
(6.13) ΣS3m = Sm × Sm × Sm × Z2(ρm)× Z3(νm),
where 1 ≤ m ≤ n/3, with fixed point subspace
(6.14) Fix(Σ
S3
m ) = R
{(
v1, . . . , v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, v2, . . . , v2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, v3, . . . , v3︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−3m times
)}
,
where κv1 = v2, θv1 = v2, θ
2v1 = v3, that is, v1 ∈ R
{(
1,− 12 ,− 12
)}
, v2 ∈
R
{(− 12 , 1,− 12)} , v3 ∈ R{(− 12 ,− 12 , 1)}.
IV) If n ≥ 3, then all the axial branches are generically unstable.
Remark 6.3. Observe that for n = 2 the list of axial subgroups in Theorem 6.2
reduces to the axial subgroups of the action of D6 on R2.
We start by interpreting Theorem 6.2 in terms of opinion formation and postpone
its proof to the end of the section. Each axial subgroup constructed in Theorem 6.2
admits two interpretations, depending on whether Na = 3 and No = n, or No = 3
and Na = n. When Na = 3 and No = n, the interpretation of the axial subgroup
Σ×m is sketched in Figure 12a. In this representation, κ ∈ S3 acts by swapping agents
1 and 2. The factor Z2(κ) therefore imposes that agent 1’s and agent 2’s opinions
are equal. The fixed point subspace of this subgroup describes the situation in which
agent 3 strongly favors the first m options and weakly disfavors the last No−m options
or strongly disfavors the first m options and weakly favors the last No −m option.
Both agents 1 and 2 are more moderate. Their opinions are opposite to agent 3’s
opinion, but with the half of the strength. When No = 3 and No = n, κ ∈ S3 acts by
swapping options 1 and 2 and the resulting interpretation is sketched in Figure 12b.
A small group of agents (the extremists) strongly favor (disfavor) option 3, while
a larger group of agents (the moderates) weakly disfavor (favor) option 3 and are
unopinionated between options 1 and 2.
For the axial ΣZ2 , when Na = 3 and No = n, the factor Z2(ρn/2) implies that
agent 1 and agent 2 develop exactly opposite opinions about the No options. The
axial fixed point subspace can then be interpreted as follows (Figure 13a). Agent 1
favors the first n/2 options and disfavors the last n/2 options, while agent 2 disfavors
the first n/2 options and favors the last n/2 options. Agent 3 remains unopinionated
about all options. When No = 3 and Na = n, the factor Z2(ρn/2) implies that the
agent group splits in two equally sized groups with exactly opposite opinions. By
analyzing the axial fixed point subspace, we conclude that one group favors option 1,
strongly disfavors option 2, weakly disfavors option 3, while the other group strongly
favors option 2, strongly disfavor option 1, and weakly disfavors option 3 (Figure 13b).
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We finally interpret the axial ΣS3m . When Na = 3 and No = n, the factor Z2(ρm)
implies that the opinion that agent 1 has about the first m options is the same as
the opinion that agent 2 has about the second m options, and vice-versa. The factor
Z3(%m) implies that the opinion that agent 1 has about the first (resp. second, third)
m options is the same as the opinion that the second agent has about the third
(resp. first, second) m options and the same as the opinion that the third agent has
about the second (resp. third, first) m options. All agents are neutral about the last
No − 3m options. This interpretation is sketched in Figure 14a. It shows that this
axial corresponds to each agent possessing an ensemble of m strongly favored (resp.
disfavored - not shown in the figure) options, while equally disfavoring (resp. favoring)
2m of the remaining options and remaining neutral about the remaining No − 3m
options. When No = 3 and Na = n the interpretation is straightforward. Na − 3m
agent are unopinionated and the remaining 3m agent opinions are distributed in the
2 simplex with D3 ∼= S3 (i.e., equilateral triangle) symmetry (Figure 14b). There are
two possible configurations. In one, each group of m agent has its favorite option. In
the other, each group has its disfavored option and is conflicted between the remaining
two options.
6.4. A first result for general Na ≥ 3 and No ≥ 3 disagreement. In the
sequel we provide a list of axial subgroups for the action of Γ = Sn × Sk on the
dissensus space Wd = Vn ⊗ Vk ∼= Rn−1 ⊗ Rk−1 as defined in Table 3.
We need some preliminary notions and definitions. The normalizer of a subgroup
Σ ⊂ Γ is
NΓ(Σ) = {γ ∈ Γ : γΣ = Σγ}
A well known result is γ ∈ NΓ(Σ) if and only if γ(Fix(Σ)) = Fix(Σ). Indeed, if σ ∈ Σ,
γ ∈ NΓ(Σ), and x ∈ Fix(Σ), then σ(γx) = γ(σx) = γx, and therefore γx ∈ Fix(Σ).
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Define
(6.15) A×˙B = {γ ∈ NΓ(A×B) : γ|Fix(A×B) = 1Fix(A×B)}.
Note that A×˙B is axial if and only if dim Fix(A × B) = 1. Indeed, by definition,
if γ ∈ A×˙B and z ∈ Fix(A × B) then γz = z. It follows that Fix(A × B) ⊂
Fix(A×˙B) and dim Fix(A × B) ≤ dim Fix(A×˙B). However, A × B ⊂ A×˙B and
therefore dim Fix(A × B) ≥ dim Fix(A×˙B). It follows that, in general, dim Fix(A ×
B) = dim Fix(A×˙B). If A×˙B is axial, then dim Fix(A × B) = dim Fix(A×˙B) = 1.
Conversely, if dim Fix(A × B) = 1, then dim Fix(A×˙B) = 1 and it remains to prove
that A×˙B is an isotropy subgroup. Let Fix(A × B) = R{z} and suppose γ ∈ Σz.
Then, γ : Fix(A×B)→ Fix(A×B) and therefore γ ∈ NΓ(A×B). Moreover, γ fixes
z and so, by definition, γ ∈ A×˙B. It follows that Σz is a subset of A×˙B and equallity
follows because the reverse inclusion is straightforward.
Partition {1, . . . , n} into r ≥ 2 blocks such that the first s ≥ 2 blocks have each
the same number m of elements. Let the order 2 element ρm ∈ Sn×Sk be defined as
ρm = (σm, σ(12)),
where σm ∈ Sn swaps the first two blocks of vectors and σ(12) ∈ Sk swaps the first
two elements of each vector. In other words, the element ρm simultaneously swaps
the first two blocks of vectors, (Z1, . . . ,Zm) ↔ (Zm+1, . . . ,Z2m), and the first and
second element of each vector. Let also ν
(s)
m ∈ Sn×Sk be the order s element defined
as
νsm = (µ
(s)
m , σ(12···s))
where µ
(s)
m ∈ Sn cycles forward the first s blocks of vectors and σ(12···s) ∈ Sk cycles
forward the first s components of each vector. In other words, the element ν
(s)
m
simultaneously cycles forward the first s blocks of vectors and the first s components
of each vector. The proof of the following theorem is provided in Section A.
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Theorem 6.4. Consider the action of Γ = Sn×Sk on Wd = Vn⊗Vk as specified
above. Then the following hold.
I)
Σ×m,l = A×˙B
is axial if and only if A ⊂ Sn is an axial subgroup of the action of Sn on
Rn−1, that is, A = Sm×Sn−m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n2 , and B ⊂ Sk is an axial subgroup
of the action of Sk on Rk−1, that is, B = Sl×Sk−l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k2 . The associated
fixed point subspace is
Fix(A×˙B) =R
{(
vl, . . . , vl︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, mm−nvl, . . . ,
m
m−nvl︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−m times
)}
,
where vl ∈ Fix(B), that is, vl ∈ R
{(
1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l times
, ll−k , . . . ,
l
l−k︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−l times
)}
.7
Suppose that Σ ∈ Sn × Sk is axial and that
(6.16) Σ = {(τ, ϕ(τ)), τ ∈ H}
where H ⊂ Sn is a subgroup and ϕ : Sn → Sk is a group homomorphism.
II) If ϕ(H) = Ss, 2 ≤ s < k, then necessarily s = nm and
ΣSs = Sm × · · · × Sm︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
×Z2(ρm)× Zs(ν(s)m )
and its fixed point subspace is
Fix(Σ) = R
{(
v0, . . . , v0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, σ(12···s)(v0, . . . , v0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
), . . . , (σ(12···s))s−1(v0, . . . , v0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
)
)}
where v0 =
(− (s− 1), 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
s−1 times
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−s times
)
.
III) If ϕ(H) = Sk, then
ΣSkm = Sm × · · · × Sm︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
×Z2(ρm)× Zk(ν(k)m )
and its fixed point subspace is
Fix(Σ) = R
{(
v1, . . . , v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, σ(12···k)(v1, . . . , v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
), . . . , (σ(12···s))k−1(v1, . . . , v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
), 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−km times
)}
where v1 = (−(k − 1), 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rk.
IV) If n, k ≥ 3 then all axial branches are unstable.
7A case in which A×˙B ) A×B is for n = k = 4, m = l = 2, in which case the order-two element
that simultaneously swaps the two blocks of agents and the two blocks of options is in A×˙B (and
clearly not in A×B).
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Theorem 6.4 provides a first list of axial subgroups for Γ = Sn × Sk acting on
Wd. All axial subgroup listed in Theorems 5.3 and 6.2 are special cases of those listed
in Theorem 6.4. It remains an open question whether the list of axial subgroups in
Theorem 6.4 is complete. The key point in proving exhaustiveness of the axial list for
k = 3 was Lemma A.1, which shows that the graph representation condition (6.16) is
satisfied. We still do not know whether the same condition is true for a general k.
7. Conclusions and future directions. We developed a new theoretical frame-
work to describe, analyze, and predict the dynamics of opinion formation for an
arbitrary number of agents and an arbitrary number of options. Our approach is
model-independent and thus suitable to embrace a rich variety of biological, social,
and artificial systems under the mild empirical hypothesis that they approximately
satisfy suitable symmetry assumptions. The symmetry assumptions we rely on cap-
ture the situation in which agents are equal in the decision process and options are a
priori equally valuable. This idealized situation is maximally symmetric and reveals
all the richness of the possible opinion-formation behaviors: consensus, dissensus, their
co-existence, and the emergence of prototypical types of dissensus, namely, uniform
and moderate/extremist. It further reveals that transitions between these behaviors
are ruled by a small number of parameters. The cooperative or competitive nature
of agent interactions is particularly important and tiny changes in the balance be-
tween agents’ cooperativity and competitivity can lead to dramatic changes in their
collective opinion behavior.
The key to developing our theory is equivariant bifurcation theory, which provides
the model-independent tools to analyze the full richness of opinion-formation dynam-
ics without fixing any specific set of equations. At the same time, our analysis of the
specific symmetries of opinion-forming dynamics provides novel results in equivariant
bifurcation theory, namely the classifications of all the axial subgroups of the action
of Sn×S3 on Rn−1⊗R2 and the full classification of dissensus behaviors in the case of
three options and arbitrary number of agents. Moreover, the vector field realization
of the model-independent theory, presented in the companion paper [5], was guided
by the handful of cases in which equivariant singularity theory, and thus equivariant
normal forms, have been developed, which further stress the importance of these tools
for modeling high-dimensional complex behaviors like collective opinion formation.
Appendix A. Proofs of the main results.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Notice that all the subgroups listed in the statement of
the theorem are axial subgroups for the given action, as evident from the associated
fixed point subspace. Item IV) is a direct consequence of the existence of a dissensus
quadratic equivariant [35, Theorem 2.14] (see also [36, Theorem XIII.4, page 90]).
The rest of the proof aims at showing that no other axial subgroups exist.
I) We begin by proving that, modulo conjugacy, if an axial subgroup Σ satisfies
Σ = A × B with A ⊂ Sn and B ⊂ S3, then necessarily Σ = Σ×m for some m. Up
to conjugacy, B is either 1, Z2(κ), Z3(θ), or S3. If B = 1, then it follows by [22,
Lemma 3.1] that Fix(Σ) = FixVNa (A)⊗ V3 is even dimensional; and Σ is not axial. If
B = Z3(θ) or B = S3, then (1, θ) ∈ Σ and, invoking again [22, Lemma 3.1],
(A.1) Fix(Σ) ⊂ Fix(Z3(1, θ)) = VNa ⊗ FixV3(Z3(θ)) = VNa ⊗ {0} = {0}.
Hence, Σ is not axial. If B = Z2(κ), then
FixV3(B) = {y ∈ V3 : y1 = y2} ∼= R
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and thus Fix(Σ) = FixVNa (A)⊗R ∼= FixVNa (A), A ⊂ Sn. So Σ is axial if A is an axial
subgroup of Sn acting on VNa
∼= Rn−1. Axial subgroups of Sn acting on VNa ∼= Rn−1
are known [25, 2] and are exactly of the form A = Sm × Sn−m, for 1 ≤ m ≤ n/2.
II), III) We now prove that any other axial subgroup is either of the form ΣZ2
or ΣS3 . Let Π : Sn × S3 → Sn be the projection homomorphism. Then H = Π(Σ)
is a subgroup of Sn for any axial subgroup Σ. We need two lemmas, whose proof is
provided below.
Lemma A.1. Suppose Σ ⊂ Sn × S3 is axial with respect to the given action and
that, up to conjugacy, Σ 6= Σ×m, for any 1 ≤ m ≤ n/2. Then ker(Π|Σ) = (1,1), and
(A.2) Σ = {(τ, ϕ(τ)) : τ ∈ H}
where ϕ : H → S3 is a group homomorphism. Morever, up to conjugacy, ϕ(H) can
neither be 1 nor Z3(θ).
Let L = ker ϕ ⊂ H ⊂ Sn. Then
(A.3) Σ/(L,1) ∼= H/L ∼= ϕ(H).
Lemma A.2. If Σ is an isotropy subgroup then L is an isotropy subgroup.
It follows by Lemma A.2 that L is a an isotropy subgroup of Sn acting on Rn−1,
that is [25, 2], L = Sk1 × · · · × Sks and thus
(A.4) Fix((L,1)) = {(v¯1, . . . , v¯1, . . . , v¯s, . . . , v¯s), v¯i ∈ V3},
where the i-th block has dimension ki. Notice also that L is a normal subgroup of
H, that is, hLh−1 = L for all h ∈ H, because kernels of group homomorphisms are
always normal8.
We now conclude the proof in for case II., i.e., ϕ(H) = Z2(κ), which will provide
the axial conjugacy class ΣZ2 . If ϕ(H) = Z2(κ), then (A.3) implies that L has index
two (i.e., the order of ϕ(H)) in H and (L,1) has index two in Σ. It follows that there
must exist h ∈ H, with h2 ∈ L, such that
Σ = (L,1) ∪ (hL, κ).
The condition h2 ∈ L follows by the fact that κ2 = 1 and thus, if a is in the coset hL,
then (a, κ)2 = (a2,1) and a2 must be in the coset L. Because h commutes with L, it
must swap equally sized pairs of blocks in (A.4) and up to conjugacy by elements of
L we can take h to be of order two9. The resulting isotropy conditions read
(v¯i1, v¯i2,−(v¯i1 + v¯i2)) = (v¯i2, v¯i1,−(v¯i1 + v¯i2))
for each block that is not swapped by h and
(v¯i1, v¯i2,−(v¯i1 + v¯i2)) = (v¯j1, v¯j2,−(v¯j1 + v¯j2))
8Suppose G is a group and ϕ : G → G′ is a group homomorphism. Suppose x ∈ ker, ϕ, that
is ϕ(x) = e. Then, given y ∈ G, we have ϕ(yxy−1) = ϕ(y)ϕ(x)ϕ(y−1) = ϕ(y)ϕ(y)−1 = e, that is,
yxy−1 ∈ ker ϕ.
9Indeed, let Bi be the set of coordinate indexes in the i-th block. Then L(Bi) = Bi for all i, and
because the permutation action is transitive no other L-invariant coordinate index set exists except
the Bi’s. It follows that L(h(Bi)) = h(L(Bi)) = h(Bi), that is h(Bi) = Bj for some j. Moreover
h2(Bi) = Bi, because otherwise h
2 /∈ L
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for each pair of blocks that are swapped by h. Suppose there are r ≤ s/2 pairs of
blocks which are swapped by h and (s− 2r) blocks which are fixed by h. Each block
that is not swapped count for one degree of freedom. Each pair of swapped blocks
count for two degrees of freedom. Furthermore, we must impose the disagreement
condition condition k1v¯1 + · · ·+ksv¯s = 0, which only eliminates one degree of freedom
because of the isotropy conditions. It follows that dim Fix(Σ) = (s−2r)+2r−1 = s−1
and thus s = 2, and r = 0 or r = 1. If r = 0, then h = 1 and we go back to the
conjugacy class of product axials Σ×n
2
. If r = 1 we obtain the conjugacy class ΣZ2 .
To conclude the proof for case III., i.e., ϕ(H) = S3, we proceed similarly. By (A.3),
there exist h1, h2 ∈ H such that
Σ = (L,1) ∪ (h1L, κ) ∪ (h2L, θ),
with h21 ∈ L, h22 ∈ H −L, and h32 ∈ L. That is, h1 swaps pairs of blocks and h2 cycles
triplets of blocks. Up to conjugacy by elements of L we can take h1 to be of order
two and h2 to be of order three. Any block which is not cycled by h2 is zero because
the isotropy condition
(v¯i1, v¯i2,−(v¯i1 + v¯i2)) = (−(v¯i1 + v¯i2), v¯i1, v¯i2)
implies v¯ip = 0, p = 1, 2. Imposing the isotropy condition associated to the element
(h2, θ) on a block triplet defined by v¯i, v¯j , v¯l that is cycled by h2 implies
v¯i1 = −(v¯l1 + v¯l2) = v¯j2
v¯i2 = v¯l1 = −(v¯j1 + v¯j2)(A.5)
−(v¯i1 + v¯i2) = v¯l2 = v¯j1
where, of course, the three blocks have the same size. If h1 does not swap at least
two of the three blocks cycled by h2, then the isotropy condition associated to κ, i.e.,
v¯p1 = v¯p2, p = i, j, l, implies that the whole block triplet is zero. Any block triplet
which is cycled by h2 and in which h1 swaps two blocks (up to conjugacy we can take
them to be the last two), contribute one degree of freedom to the fixed point subspace.
Indeed, the isotropy condition associated to (h1, κ) reads v¯i1 = v¯j2, v¯i2 = v¯j2, v¯l1 =
v¯l2, which, together with (A.5) implies vi = c
(
1,− 12 ,− 12
)
, vj = c
(− 12 , 1,− 12) , vl =
c
(− 12 ,− 12 , 1), c ∈ R. If Σ is axial, then there exists only one such block triplet and
the conjugacy class ΣS3 follows.
Proof of Lemma A.1. The elements of ker(Π|Σ) are of the form (1, α) with α ∈ S3.
Using the fact that conjugation leaves the kernel invariant, to prove the first part of the
statement it suffices to exclude that (1, θ) ∈ Σ and (1, κ) ∈ Σ, because all non-trivial
elements of S3 are either conjugate to θ or κ.
If (1, θ) ∈ Σ then it follows by (A.1) that Σ is not axial.
If (1, κ) ∈ Σ two cases are possible: either (τ, θ) 6∈ Σ for any τ ∈ Sn or (τ, θ) ∈ Σ
for some τ ∈ Sn. The former can be excluded because in that case Σ = A × Z2(κ)
for some A ⊂ Sn, and it follows as in I) that Σ = Σ×m for some 1 ≤ m < n/2. The
second case can also be excluded because, if (1, κ) ∈ Σ, then
Fix(Σ) ⊂ VNa ⊗ {y ∈ V3 : y1 = y2},
and the generic isotropy condition imposed by the element (τ, θ) reads (zi1, zi1,−2zi1) =
(−2zτ(i)1, zτ(i)1, zτ(i)1), which implies zi1 = zτ(i)1 = 0 and thus Zj = 0 for all j.
Therefore Σ is not axial.
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It follows by the First Isomorphism Theorem that Σ/ ker(Π|Σ) = Σ is isomorphic
to H, and therefore (A.2) holds. Up to conjugacy, the image ϕ(H) can be either 1,
Z2(κ), Z3(θ), or S3. If ϕ(H) = 1, then Σ = A × 1, with A ⊂ Sn, a case that was
already excluded. If ϕ(H) = Z3(θ), then Σ only contains elements of Sn and elements
of the form (τ, θ), for some τ ∈ Sn. The associated isotropy conditions take the form
(zi1, zi2,−(zi1 + zi2)) = (−(zτ(i)1 + zτ(i)2), zτ(i)1, zτ(i)2) whose solution space in even
dimensional and therefore Σ cannot be axial.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Let x be a vector which is fixed by Σ. Then, in particular,
x is fixed by L, because (L,1) ⊂ Σ. Let γ be an element of Sn which also fixes x.
Then (γ,1) must be in Σ because Σ is an isotropy subgroup, and therefore γ is in
ker ϕ = L.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. We first prove Item I. of the statement and then sketch
the proof for Items II. and III.
I) The following lemma follows from Lemma 3.1 in [22]
Lemma A.3. Let A ⊂ Sn and B ⊂ Sk be subgroups. Then
dimW(Fix(A×B)) = 1
if and only if
dimRn−1(Fix(A)) = 1 and dimRk−1(Fix(B)) = 1
If A and B are axial subgroups, then dim FixW(A × B) = 1 and Proposition A.3
implies that A×˙B is axial. Conversely, if A×˙B is axial, then dim FixW(A×˙B) =
dim FixW(A×B) and Lemma A.3 implies that A and B are axial.
II), III) Under the hypothesis that the axial subgroup can be written as the graph
of a homomorphism (6.16), we can find its general form by following the same ideas
as the case k = 3 above. If ϕ(H) = Ss, 2 ≤ s ≤ k, then L = kerϕ has index s! (i.e.,
the order of ϕ(H)) in H and (L,1) has index s! in Σ. It follows that, up to conjugacy,
there must exist and order two element h1 ∈ H and an order s element h2 ∈ H such
that
Σ = (L,1) ∪ (h1L, σ(12)) ∪ (h2L, σ(12···s)).
Moreover, invoking Lemma A.2, L = Sk1 × · · · × Skr with
Fix(L) = {(c1, . . . , c1, . . . , cr, . . . , cr), ci ∈ Vk},
and h1 and h2 must permute (equally-sized) blocks of vectors in Fix(L) because, since
L is normal, they both commute with L. By counting dimensions in the resulting
isotropy conditions the result follows.
Appendix B. Algebraic for axial subgroup computation.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Altafini, Consensus problems on networks with antagonistic interactions, IEEE Transac-
tions on Automatic Control, 58 (2013), pp. 935–946.
[2] D. Aronson, M. Golubitsky, and M. Krupa, Coupled arrays of josephson junctions and
bifurcation of maps with sn symmetry, Nonlinearity, 4 (1991), p. 861.
[3] G. Bala´zsi, A. van Oudenaarden, and J. Collins, Cellular decision making and biological
noise: from microbes to mammals, Cell, 144 (2011), pp. 910–925.
[4] L. Bayındır, A review of swarm robotics tasks, Neurocomputing, 172 (2016), pp. 292–321.
Na No Wc Action of Γ Axial Σ Fix(Σ) Reference
3 2 R{(1, 1, 1)} Γ = Z2(τ) 1 Wc [34, Chapter VI]
τZ = −Z
2 3 R{u1, u2} Γ = S3(κ, ρ) Z2(κ) (5.2) [36, Section XIII.5]
ui = (vi, vi) ∈ (R3)2 κZ = (κZ1, κZ2)
ρZ = (ρZ1, ρZ2)
κZi = (zi2, zi1, zi3)
ρZi = (zi3, zi1, zi2)
n k R{u1, . . . , uk−1} Γ = Sk(κ, ρ) Σp = Sp × Sk−p (5.5) [23]
ui = (vi, . . . , vi) ∈ (Rk)n κZ = (κZ1, . . . , κZn) 1 ≤ p ≤ b k2 c
ρZ = (ρZ1, . . . , ρZn) (5.4)
κZi = (zi2, zi1, zi3, . . . , zik)
ρZi = (zik, zi1, zi2, . . . , zi(k−1))
Table 1
Algebraic data for consensus opinion formation. In the table, v1, . . . , vk−1 ∈ Rk denotes a basis of Vk, as defined in (2.5). Algebraic data whose expression
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